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ABSTRACT 
The Electoral Connection in Multi-Level Systems with Non-Static Ambition: 
Linking Political Careers and Legislative Performance in Argentina 
by 
Juan Pablo Micozzi 
Legislators who do not expect to be permanently reelected are not necessarily 
non-ambitious politicians. Whenever current legislators have different office 
goals in mind, it is likely that they try to use their available resources to further 
those aims. Thus, it can be expected that they bias the content of the bills they 
draft towards their prospective constituents. Through the analysis of 180,000 bills 
and an original database of candidacies in Argentina, I demonstrate that 
legislators who have subnational executive ambitions tend to submit more 
municipality-based legislation. This finding is substantive for the literature on 
electoral systems, political careers and representation in federal regimes; as well 
as the keystone towards the creation of a general theory of legislative 
performance in multilevel systems. 
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1) Introduction 
"Ambition lies at the heart of politics" 
Joseph Schlesinger, 1966 
"I know that, after all this, I'm a political corpse" 
Deputy Agustin Rossi, 2008, leader of the Peronist majority, after backing a 
presidential bill rejected by most of his province's inhabitants 
Ambition is one of the main engines of political activity. Broadly understood, 
every single subject must have had some degree of ambition as a motivation of, at least, 
some activity in life. People can be ambitious at pushing for economic improvement, at 
expecting a new job, at trying to be drafted by an NBA team or at trying to make a 
dissertation as good as possible. Attempts to attain a higher order-goal seem not only 
almost "natural" for individuals and groups, but also profitable. If expectations of 
improvement are almost a necessary condition for success in the modern (or 
postmodern?) era, why should they be absent in politics? 
Politicians are not usually the most praised individuals in democratic societies. 
Thus, political ambition can often be understood as desires of becoming a king, a queen, 
an emperor, or simply a multi-billionaire. However, as much as the mentioned 
Schlesinger is recognized as a serious and honest scholar (as nobody has denied it), the 
concept of ambition must be understood as much more than mere latent corrupt 
tendencies. Ambitious politicians have goals in mind and act in consequence. As in life, 
sometimes their first preferences are attained (i.e. some individuals have become 
presidents or prime ministers); some other times, people fail in their attempts; or some 
other subjects may enact a suboptimal strategy, in order to avoid ending up without 
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anything. Also, other individuals may not aspire anything more than moving back to the 
private market or simply enjoying a well-deserved retirement. So, patterns of ambition 
are likely to differ not only across individuals and circumstances, but also across time 
and space. 
Institutions affect behavior in a variety of ways. As most of the conventional 
literature has demonstrated (see North 1990), variation in institutional constraints is 
likely to exert different incentives over individual and collective action. Politicians 
facing specific limits and permits might act different from what they would do if some 
constraints were absent. Thus, particular rules and procedures can also shape ambition. 
As an evident example, Mexican deputies will not further a consecutive re-appointment 
in a party ballot after their current term, just because term limits do not permit them to 
run for reelection. In contrast, American representatives pursue consecutive reelection, 
often until retiring from politics. It is almost obvious that a set of dissimilar institutions, 
procedures, resources and punishments shapes their current activity and their 
prospective goals. However, the literature has usually overcome that variation and has 
highlighted the specificity of the American case as a device with a heuristic value. The 
"almost-axiomatic status" (Carey 1996) of the American causal mechanism linking 
institutions, practices and ambition has tainted part of the comparative research. There 
is life beyond the U.S., and there is also variation in terms of the existing institutional 
frameworks worldwide. Thus, patterns of ambition can also vary. 
So, how to analyze patterns of ambition across the U.S. boundaries? First, full 
comprehension of the cases is a must-do. Second, the use of appropriate causal 
mechanisms is also a necessary condition. While most of the theoretical advancements in 
the topic have been performed for the American case, nothing forbids complete and 
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consistent analyses of comparative settings. One of the main components of the 
explanations for the permanent attempts to get reelected by U.S. House members is the 
notion of "electoral connection" (Mayhew 1974). Through the delivery of local policies to 
a set of (usually stable) delimited constituents, legislators expect their recognition every 
two years and their permanence in the seat. Therefore, the expectation ("the ambition") 
is static, which means, they just stay where they are. What happens when those 
"conservative" goals are not necessarily the rule? How should we analyze ambition if 
the structure of incentives differs from the Mayhewian model? 
As mentioned above, Mexican legislators (similar to their Costa Rican colleagues) 
do not have static ambition, just because they cannot seek reelection. Nevertheless, it is 
false to think that only politicians facing term limits might not try to keep their seat. 
What if other positions were more profitable for politicians' political future? What if 
patterns of ambition involved multiple positions across political arenas and time? David 
Samuels (2004) showed that a substantive proportion of Brazilian Congressmen tend to 
look for subnational positions, instead of trying to renew their legislative mandate. 
However, as Lodola (2009) pointed out, about a 70% of Brazilian Deputados do pursue a 
new appointment in the party tickets. In a similar but also different fashion, Jones & at 
(2002) explained that just a 15% of the Argentine legislators look for reelection. Given 
that the most of the remaining 85% do stay in politics but not in Congress, the questions 
about their future become salient. Here, the main point is not only where do they go, but 
also what do they do in order to reach those non-legislative ambitions. 
As the specialized literature on Argentina (Benton 2003, Spiller and Tommasi 
2007) highlighted, subnational executive positions are forceful references for every 
single ambitious politician. The ability of managing resources, sharing jobs, using public 
4 
goods and getting TV cameras is clearly higher than that of a dark office in Congress. In 
as much, local executives (namely, governors and mayors) are focal points for party 
power. Hence, politicians might devote most of their efforts in running for these 
positions and winning the spots. If we understand rationality as the use of the best 
strategy to attain a particular goal; we also need to observe what the actions of the 
agents pursuing that goal are. Specifically, a rational and ambitious politician should do 
whatever she can in order to attain her aims. Assuming that legislation is a valid good 
that might trigger politicians' recognition by voters, party leaders and interest groups; 
short-termed legislators should act strategically during their tenure. The intuition would 
suggest that current congressmen's subnational ambition might affect the legislation 
they submit. In as much, national legislators do not reach the House without any 
previous background. In fact, some of them do arrive after serving as governor or 
mayor. Regardless of the motivation of those jumps, we should expect that legislators 
will bias their bills towards their former constituents. In sum, career background and 
career further ambitions seem to be playing a role in shaping current legislation. I use a 
unique dataset of career information, legislative production and contextual institutional 
and political information, to test my main hypothesis: ambition shapes legislative 
production in Argentina. 
The second chapter deals the different theoretical and empirical approaches to 
the concept of ambition. It also discusses the extent to which the notion of the "electoral 
connection" is restricted to personal-based electoral rules such as the ones in the U.S. 
In the third chapter, I include some of the conventional statements about the 
effects of electoral rules over legislative behavior, by interacting them with notions of 
political ambition. The implications of the traditional views about the Argentine 
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Congress are therefore explored over that basis, and I discuss a new empirical strategy. I 
also evaluate issues of data and measurement here. 
The fourth chapter describes the research strategy and the data gathering process 
employed to test the theoretical hypotheses. 
The fifth chapter analyzes the relationship between previous career backgrounds 
and legislative production. The degree of submission of territorially-bounded legislation 
is an underlying dimension in the empirical model of this chapter. 
In the sixth chapter, I test whether immediate subnational executive ambitions 
also shape bill-drafting. The intuition is that legislators who are seeking gubernatorial or 
mayoral offices will be more prone to submit local legislation that help them during 
future subnational campaigns. 
In the seventh section, I evaluate whether proposing local-targeted bills affect the 
chances of winning subnational offices. I test the effects of the number (and the 
proportion) of local bills submitted on the electoral victory for gubernatorial or mayoral 
positions. 
I discuss the overall findings and conclude the thesis in the eighth chapter, where 
I also point extensions and further lines of research out. 
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Chapter 2: Ambition and Politics in Different Settings 
Ambition and Legislative Performance in the US House 
When David Mayhew published his seminal piece "Congress: The Electoral 
Connection" in 1974, he may have expected a substantive influence in the field of 
American Politics. However, he might not have even imagined how influential his work 
would become, not only for explanations of the American Congress, but also for 
legislative studies in a comparative perspective. 
A presumably simple causal relationship between institutions, goals and 
practices, and legislative behavior in a specific context (U.S. House) defined the 
literature in the topic from then on. Specifically, Mayhew explains legislative behavior in 
an institutional environment characterized by single-member districts, mandatory direct 
primaries (with minimal party control over candidate access to the primary ballot) as 
candidate selection mechanisms, and legislative careerism as the most common pattern. 
Individual incumbents try to get reelected and increase their power in the electoral 
arena, within their party and also within the legislature (Fenno 1978, Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, 2005). This theoretical model became a foundation of most legislative 
studies in different settings. However, the specificity of the American case is what made 
the model fit so well. The ability of the causal relationship to "travel" is more subject to 
doubts. 
Part of the validity of the argument relies on an empirical proposition: The 
House is a central component of policymaking in the American political system (Shepsle 
1978, Weingast and Moran 1983, Weingast and Marshall 1988, Krehbiel 1991). Therefore, 
staying in the legislature makes a representative a potentially powerful subject in the 
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decision making process. As many theories from different perspectives demonstrated 
(Shepsle and Weingast 1984, Krehbiel 1991, Cox 2006), the division of the labor in the 
House gives committees a preponderant role. Committee members have gatekeeping 
powers (Denzau and McKay 1983, Krehbiel 1987) over which policies will be sent to the 
floor. Regardless of the debate between party-based or preference-based behavior by 
committee members; it is clear that they play a key role in determining what policies are 
implemented. For this reason, the literature has recognized how important committee 
membership (and especially a chairmanship) is for politicians. Staying in the House 
within an area of policy specialization is likely to be a substantive source of resources to 
do politics (i.e. money, access to media, staff, or sponsorship of interest groups). This 
makes a long-lasting tenure as a representative a goal itself. 
In fact, theories that understand congressional institutions as endogenous to 
legislators' preferences state that rules were designed to ensure the stability of its 
members (Shepsle 1978, Shepsle and Weingast 1987, Weingast and Marshall 1988). 
Scholars continually demonstrate empirical support for this goal. Congressmen do 
pursue permanent reelection, and succeed 90% of the time (Fowler and McClure 1990). 
The literature recognizes that incumbents are in a privileged position for nmning again 
and again for the same seat. The concept "incumbency advantage" refers to a process 
that feeds legislators' positive circle of success. Scholars have highlighted legislative 
resources such as legislative staff, franking privileges and other material resources 
(Fiorina 1989, Abramowitz 1991, Levitt and Wolfram 1997, Gelman and King 1990), 
campaigning visibility (Fiorina 1977, Mann and Wolfinger 1980, Mayhew 1974, Zaller 
1998) and deterrence for potential challengers (Cox and Katz 1996, 2002, Erikson 1971a, 
Mann and Wolfinger 1980, Stone, Maisel and Maestas 2004) as predictors of incumbents' 
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continual success. 
A main strategy legislators adopt to pursue permanent reelection is to deliver 
locally-based legislation that creates a link with their constituents (Fiorina 1977; 
Johannes 1984; Bond 1985). The underlying causal mechanism assumes some degrees of 
policy convergence between voters and representatives, which poses a whole strategic 
challenge for every ambitious legislator (Erikson and Wright 1980,1997; Jacobson 1997, 
Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2000). Miller and Stokes (1963) understand this 
process as "policy agreement" or "congruence"; Achen (1983) terms it "responsiveness", 
while Fenno (1973) understands it as the development of a "home style" vis-a-vis 
legislators and voters. Voters get information about their representative's performance, 
evaluate whether "their interests" were translated into policies and then reward or 
punish the incumbent (Fiorina 1981). Since most incumbents get reelected, we might 
infer that patterns of representation are successful. All these practices tend to reinforce 
the conservative nature of the American system, fostering stability, professionalization, 
and specialization. 
For all the mentioned evidence, ambition is considered static in the US House. 
However, every congressman must have run for election for the first time at some time 
point. Do they all enter the legislative race without any previous experience? Is the 
legislative poll their first and only attempt in public office? Not typically. Politicians 
usually start their political careers at the local level and climb up the political ladder. 
Before reaching the House, U.S. politicians show patterns of progressive ambition 
(Schlesinger 1966, Black 1972, Brace 1984, Squire 1988). Schlesinger's seminal book 
showed that politicians tend to pursue lower-level positions and enter into House races 
when the structure of opportunities is favorable for their victory. Thus, many 
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representatives have had a background as local legislators, local administrators, state 
legislators, governors, or members of subnational cabinets (Squire 1988, Berkman and 
Eisentein 1999). In as much, strong variation among politicians exists across states 
(Squire 1988, Francis and Kenny 1997, Maestas, Maisen and Stone 2005, Maestas, Fulton, 
Maisen and Stone 2006), by gender (Palmer and Simon 2003, Lawless and Fox 2005, 
Fulton, Maestas, Maisel and Stone 2006), and by race (Victor 2008). These factors also 
affect local politicians' decisions to compete in national races. As mentioned, once 
politicians are elected to the U.S. House, they have strong incentives to develop stable 
legislative careers; however, no uniform pattern should be assumed. 
Following Schlesinger's assertions about how calculations affect strategies, it 
logically follows that if the structure of opportunities differs, and politicians are 
motivated by a diverse set of incentives, the causal chain might differ. Thus, legislators 
might be engaged in different dynamics of responsiveness, accountability, and 
legislative activity. This was, in fact, the case of the U.S. congressmen before the? 
Progressive Era. As the literature shows, "the conventional wisdom... is that the nineteenth 
century was far too different to accommodate a strong electoral linkage between individual 
representatives and their constituents (Formisano 1974, Huckabee 1989, Polsby 1968, Price 
1975, Skeen 1986, Swift 1987-88). Most legislators were not interested in pursuing a career in 
Congress and therefore lacked incentives to heed the wishes of their constituents" (Carson and 
Engstrom 2005). In fact, party controls of candidacies, predominance of executive 
elections, party strip ballots, and limited media outlets should have discouraged 
individual-based politics (Bensel 2003, Jacobson 1990, Kernell 1977). Therefore, many of 
the concepts, mechanisms, and implications involved in the Mayhewian model may not 
have been the rule in the early U.S. Nonetheless, some recent findings challenge these 
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assertions, stating that the electoral connection was actually earlier (Carson and 
Engstrom 2005) and that the incumbency advantage was also present in the 19* century 
(Carson, Engstrom and Roberts 2006, Carson and Roberts 2005). These contributions, far 
from denying the previous claims for caution before watching the world through a 
Mayhewian lens, help us highlight two convergent issues. First, different institutional 
contexts and norms can lead to very dissimilar patterns of behavior. Second, even 
though institutions and rules can differ, some processes might still be similar, but over 
the bases of different causal mechanisms. It would be false to state that the adoption of 
primaries and the Australian ballot did not make a difference in American 
Congressional politics; however, the recognition of the existence of an early "electoral 
connection" is not the same as stating that nothing has changed. 
In sum, theories, concepts, and implications created for a particular setting can 
have very different outcomes if they are applied to a different environment. In as much, 
specific processes might be recognized in extremely different contexts, but they might be 
product of very different causal mechanisms. This forces us to think about the accuracy 
(and the particularities) of concepts such as electoral connection, political ambition, and 
legislative performance in a broader set of cases. 
Ambition and Legislative Performance beyond the US House 
It is not a new finding to state that not all of the world's legislatures operate under 
the same set of premises. In particular, in contrast to the U.S. model, many countries 
have institutional designs that do not foster the development of personal electoral 
reputations (e.g., systems with closed party lists and proportional representation), where 
candidates are not free from party constraints (national, regional, or local partisan 
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control of candidacies) and reelection is not necessarily the main goal (different political 
positions are considered more desirable). Given such differences, and their many 
possible combinations, the expected political outcomes are likely to vary from the 
Mayhewian model. In particular, legislative bodies where the reelection assumption can 
be relaxed are likely to foster different kinds of legislative activity. 
Given the particular patterns of political progress, it seems reasonable to assume 
that legislators in parliamentary regimes try to get reelected (Strom 1997). Since 
membership to the Parliament is a necessary condition to become a minister (a 
recognized goal of most politicians in these regimes); it makes absolute sense that a 
politician would try to reach and keep a seat. A good example is Cain, Ferejohn and 
Fiorina's book (1981), where they show how parliament members do constituency 
service to improve their reelection chances. For presidential regimes, the empirical 
evidence is manifold. For several studies of presidential cases other than the U.S., 
reelection can still be the main goal of politicians in federal legislative office. Navia 
(2000) and Carey (2002), worked under that assumption in their studies of Chile. Crisp 
and Desposato (2005) kept the same supposition in their analysis of the Colombian 
Senate, a claim verified by Botero (2008) in his study of the House. Carey (1996) shows 
that legislators in the pre-Chavez Venezuela had permanent reelection as their main 
goal. In contrast, other scholars reveal that legislators tend to pursue different goals 
along their careers. Taylor (1992) demonstrates that Costa Rican representatives expect 
higher positions in the federal executive, and therefore remain accountable to the 
perceived most successful presidential candidate of each of their parties. This behavior is 
triggered by term limits, but it is unclear whether it would be different, barriers absent. 
Mainwaring (1999) denies that Brazilian legislators are pure reelection seekers; in a 
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similar fashion, Samuels (1999, 2003) shows that Brazilian deputies usually seek 
subnational executive positions rather than staying in the House, in contrast to Ames' 
(1987) and Geddes' (1994) statements. Airman and Chasquetti (2005) show that 
significant proportions of legislators (30%) do not seek reelection in Uruguay. Instead, 
they look for municipal and cabinet positions. Jones et al. (2002) find that Argentinean 
legislators pursue and hold multiple offices and seldom develop stable legislative 
careers. In such frameworks, becoming a federal representative may be an important 
political position, but not necessarily the final stage of a political career. Finally, 
Langston and Aparicio (2008) find that most Mexican legislators had a previous 
subnational background and usually look for a state-level executive position after their 
term. In spite of term limits, the subnational connection seems to be a powerful source of 
political success. 
In sum, variation in institutions, practices, and goals makes it tough to interpret 
every single legislature with a purely U.S.-based scheme. The use of the causal 
mechanisms developed for the American House is a valid research strategy for 
comparative research, but it requires extreme theoretical and empirical accuracy. 
Ambition in Multi-level Systems 
The recognition that ambition must not necessarily be static adds another 
component to the analyses. In order to host some kind of progressive ambition, any 
political system must involve (by definition, and at least) more than one level of 
governance. How could progress be forged, otherwise? The first intuition is to think 
about federal countries, where different levels necessarily coexist; however, not every 
multi-tier system has to be federal (i.e. Colombia, Chile, Italy or Spain). Moreover, multi-
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level structures can also involve supra-national designs such as the European Union. 
Nevertheless, all that said, federal systems have specific characteristics that make 
analyses of multi-level political careers extremely interesting. The maintenance of 
separate yet interdependent arenas can lead to a variety of structures of incentives and 
opportunities that can also shape career paths. Coexistence of executive and legislative 
political positions at the federal, state, and municipal levels create a rich dynamic that 
must be carefully understood in order to unfold political actors' behavior. In particular, 
especially after all the decentralization process of the nineties (Haggard and Kaufman, 
1992), subnational governments became actors with enormous relevance for central 
issues like the performance of the economy (Wibbels 2000), the provision of public 
goods (Qian and Roland 1998), the quality of government (Treisman 2002) and the 
balance of budgets (Rodden 2002). Governorships and mayoral positions have become, 
hence, offices with enormous responsibilities, but also extremely profitable political 
positions. Subnational executives of federal regimes (assuming that federalism is 
decently respected) execute budgets, appoint and remove bureaucrats and lower-level 
employees, enact public works, have a privileged access to media and collect some taxes, 
among other duties. All these activities can also become interesting tokens for 
campaigning and pushing for more power, vis-a-vis either voters or party mates. If this 
was the case, shouldn't politicians have those executive positions as career goals? Why 
not think that gubernatorial and mayoral positions might be the real locus of career 
ambition in multilevel systems? 
The forceful reference for contradicting the aforementioned statement is quite 
intuitive: "look at the U.S., it doesn't work!" This is true...as true as the recognition of 
the central role of the U.S. House in the policymaking process. It should not be forgotten 
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that the American Congress is considered one of the strongest among those without 
confidence procedures (Polsby 1968). Therefore, the U.S. might be more the exception 
than the rule; the question of why is it not performing as a "typical" federal case must be 
answered somewhere else. Nevertheless, departing from the American perspective has a 
significant implication for the analysis of career ambition. Conceding that the federal 
legislative branch is not necessarily the end of careers and, therefore, people occupying a 
seat in Congress at a particular time point will not always (nor usually) seek consecutive 
reelection; the predicted direction of ambition might perfectly differ, and so might the 
expected activities performed by legislators during their tenure do. Thus, a theoretical 
adjustment becomes necessary before in order to understand how ambition, career 
paths, and legislative activities work in multilevel systems. 
The Electoral Connection in Multi-Level Systems with Non-Static Ambition 
As mentioned above, the coexistence of formally separate arenas of government 
make multilevel systems a very interesting setting to investigate political careers. In 
particular, the de facto interdependence of the different tiers makes politics likely to also 
be nested across levels. The underlying structure of incentives may allocate a specific 
value to each position at any of the levels of government. Thus, politicians are likely to 
have their own scale of preferences over office in different moments of their careers. If 
the distribution of material, symbolic and political resources in general is mostly 
concentrated in the executive positions; it is reasonable that politicians prioritize these 
offices to some others, even including legislative positions at the national level. In such a 
scenario, would the Mayhewian framework still be valid? Once the reelection 
assumption has been relaxed, the original model of the "electoral connection" becomes 
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inaccurate. This made scholars like Carey (1996) criticize the use of the "almost 
axiomatic status" of the U.S. based model. However, this erroneous appreciation does 
not necessarily imply that politicians do not care about their futures or that there is no 
electoral impact of their labor in office. It is also not necessarily true that, during their 
tenure, current legislators do not have an audience and do not write bills with a specific 
goal in mind. 
In any case, legislators in each of these multilevel and non-static environments 
can be considered rational actors in that they try to keep and increase political power. In 
doing so, they are likely to use all the available resources that can contribute to their 
political improvement. As stated in the aforementioned literature on incumbency 
advantage in the U.S., legislators in office have some valuable goods to use in their 
favor: contracts, staff, media exposure, subsidies and, of course, legislation. By writing, 
pushing, and achieving the passage of bills, legislators affect the distribution of 
resources, highlight selected events, target groups, create a sense of responsiveness, and 
control other branches of power. As most legislators do not retire after serving one 
legislative term (i.e., discrete ambition), we can safely assume that legislators 
prospectively use their current term in office to advance their future careers (Crisp & 
Desposato 2004). Following this reasoning, current legislative behavior is likely to be 
affected by career backgrounds and perspectives. In that case, legislators have strong 
temptations to consider these further political positions at the moment of writing 
legislation. As a result, specific career goals are expected to make a difference in 
congressional performance. 
In fact, this statement is not new for the literature in American politics: "Running 
for higher office usually entails an appeal to a larger, more heterogeneous constituency, those 
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with progressive ambition should introduce larger amounts of legislation (measured as the 
number of public bills introduced by the member) and be more active on the floor (measured as 
the number of speeches and amendments offered relevant to public bills) to establish a record of 
concern and to garner needed media attention (Schlesinger 1966; Prewitt and Nowlin 1969; Van 
Der Slik and ~Pernaccia.ro 1979; Cook 1986; and Hibbing 1986). Furthermore, higher office-
seekers desire media attention which can be garnered through floor activity and introducing 
legislation (Cook 1986, 1989)." (Herrick and Moore 1993). More recently, Maestas (2003) 
shows that state legislators expecting higher office spend more time monitoring their 
voters' preferences. Victor (2005) finds that representatives running for the Senate tend 
to show "more specialization in their speech making behavior than their less ambitious 
counterparts, except during the term in which they campaign for higher office." 
Similarly, Treul (2008) recognizes that Senators expecting a jump to the presidency are 
more cohesive than the rest of their colleagues. Thus, the literature has taken the impact 
of progressive ambition over legislative performance into account, not only static 
ambition. However, as already mentioned, "progressive" means "moving up" in the 
American context. "Moving up" means jumping from a local to a state-level arena, and 
from a state-level to a federal position. A single legislator's progressive goal could be 
either to run for the Senate or directly for the presidency. Given that just three spots are 
available in these positions and those usually involve an incumbent and/or other strong 
candidates; pursuing continuous reelection is a good strategy in equilibrium. 
How should a progressively ambitious legislator behave in a context where she 
expects an executive subnational position? The theoretical expectation suggests that she 
might try to bias part of her political and legislative activity towards signaling voters, 
party leaders, or any actor that might affect her chances of running and winning the 
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office. If the broad notion of "electoral connection" was right, a legislator that cares 
about her future should do any kind of constituency service in order to improve her 
reputations and bases of support. If the expectations were at the municipal level, most of 
the efforts should be directed to that district. If the goal was to become a governor, the 
province at large and /or multiple sub-constituencies should be the target. In this 
dissertation, I will focus on the empirical assessment of the theoretical intuitions 
described above. The underlying presumption is that ambitious politicians who have a 
subnational executive position as a reference should use legislation prospectively to 
further those ambitions. Thus far, no single scientific piece has dealt with the question of 
the impact ambition has on legislative activity beyond the U.S. In order to fill that gap, I 
plan to make both, a theoretical and empirical contribution. Specifically, I plan to 
develop an explanation for determinants of legislative activity in multilevel systems 
with progressive ambition. 
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Chapter 3: Legislative Performance in a Multi-level System with Non-
Static Ambition: The Case of Argentina 
How do legislators perform in office when their ambition is non-static and 
subnational positions are almost necessary references? The empirical test of such a 
question requires a substantive conceptualization effort. Due to the nascent state of the 
literature, it is unclear how many cases can be put into the category "multi-level systems 
with progressive ambition". As an additional constraint, I am interested in 
understanding how these characteristics affect politics in federal designs. The reason is 
straightforward: even though some unitary countries run elections to choose governors 
and/or mayors; the likelihood of these positions concentrating substantive shares of 
power is clearly lower than in well established federal regimes. The interaction of the 
"home rule" (local original pertinence) and the "shared rule" (coexistence of different 
units in a national arena) gives subnational units a significant degree of autonomy in 
federal regimes1. Even though a federal status is not a sufficient condition for 
subnational strength (countries can be federal de jure, but de facto unitary2), working with 
federal regimes is, nevertheless, the safest strategy to test a theory that requires 
relevance of subnational political units. As specified above, it is somewhat predictable 
that systems involving confidence procedures to appoint and dismiss cabinet members 
create incentives for legislators' permanent reelection. Thus, working with presidential 
regimes is more accurate for analyses that relax the aforementioned Mayhewian 
assumption. So far, three cases do fit in the classification: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
1
 See Riker (1964), Elazar (1987) and Stepan (2001) 
2
 The pre-1989 Venezuela and current Russia might be good examples. See Penfold-Becerra (2004) for the 
former and Remington (2008) for the latter cases. 
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Analyses of the Brazilian experience have shown that politics does involve 
multilevel behavior. In particular, subnational dynamics affect the patterns of 
campaigning (Ames 2000, Samuels 2003), the generation of alliances (the "reverse 
coattails effect", Ames 1992), the timing of elections (Samuels 2003), the distribution of 
pork (Samuels 2001) and the direction of political ambition (Samuels 2003). Following 
Samuels' assertion, "about two-thirds of Brazilian politicians continue their careers at the sub-
national level after serving in the Chamber of Deputies". Related to political careers, circa 70% 
of ruling legislators seek reelection in the Brazilian House, but just two thirds of those 
(globally 50%) get it (Samuels 2003, Lodola 2009). In contrast, most of the remaining 30% 
seek a gubernatorial or mayoral position immediately after their legislative mandates, 
and several of those still in office run for subnational positions during their legislative 
tenure. This illustrates that Brazilian politicians pursue multi-tier careers, and that the 
modified direction of progressive ambition does also take place. However, given that 
70% of incumbents are looking for reelection, the relative weight of the subnational 
ambition deserves some additional discussion, especially in comparative perspective. 
Samuels demonstrates that politicians in Brazil secure a legislative seat and then run for 
a subnational executive position. However, it is also reasonable to assume politicians 
may move in the opposite direction (e.g., mayors and governors jumping to Congress). 
Probably, only a natural experiment that unified the timing of elections would give the 
right answer. 
Mexico has recently acquired its full democratic status after decades of PRI's 
dominance. However, as stated in the literature, subnational democratization started 
earlier than the federal one, at least in terms of true electoral disputes (Hernandez 
Chavez 1994, Ochoa-Reza 2004, Gibson 2004). Increases in the competitiveness of 
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subnational races made governorships very attractive positions in order to obtain 
political power, backed by budgets that can foster the development of a successful career 
(Langston and Diaz-Cayeros 2007). Variation in institutional rules and patterns of 
competition have also shaped the different structures of opportunity for staying in the 
state or jumping to the national arena (Gonzalez 2009), thereby creating multiple sets of 
incentives to develop a multilevel career path. Given that one-period term limits are in 
effect in the Mexican House, legislators have to look for alternatives to continue their 
political careers. As Langston and Aparicio (2008) show, patterns of multilevel ambition 
are easily recognized in the Mexican setting, with politicians moving forth and back 
among municipal, provincial and federal arenas. Of course, term limits force non-
discrete ambitious politicians to anticipate the end of their mandates and overcome the 
consequences of the "zero reelection rate". Hence, the pursuit of subnational positions in 
such environment is one of the typical movements any single legislator might consider. 
Argentina is an intermediate case. Term limits are absent at the federal legislative 
level, but, indeed, the rate of incumbents seeking reelection is just about a 20%3. This is 
explained by the structures of opportunities and incentives, which make legislative 
office a not extremely valuable political position. However, as Jones et al. (2002) 
demonstrate, Argentine politicians are not amateurs. Instead, they continuously pursue 
other positions in different tiers and branches of government. Thus, ambition is clearly 
progressive in Argentina. As the data in Table 3.1 shows, about 23% of all legislators 
who have ever occupied a seat in the House have run for a subnational executive 
position at some point in their careers. Also, some politicians have served more than one 
3
 As Jones and Samuels (2004) show, only countries with term limits like Mexico and Costa Rica have 
lower reelection rates in Latin America. 
21 
period in Congress in different times of their career, and have also moved back and forth 
between the House and municipalities and/or governorships. Taking these multiple 
movements into account would increase the sample of individuals with subnational 
expectations over time. 
Table 3.1: Percentage of Legislators that ever run for a Subnational Executive 
Position 
Subnational Link 
0 
1 
Total 
Freq. 
1,159 
342 
1,501 
Percent 
77.22 
22.78 
100 
Given that a considerable portion of the sample of legislators in Argentina 
expected a spot in subnational executives, the original question about anticipation of the 
future becomes relevant again. Do patterns of legislative behavior of differ between 
individuals with executive ambitions and those without them? No single scientific piece 
has ever dealt with that issue. As an addition, the degree of subnational variation in 
Argentina (electoral institutions, term limits, patterns of continuity in power, legislative 
structure) makes the case very rich for multilevel analyses. For all the reasons 
mentioned, Argentina is an excellent case to employ an empirical test of my hypotheses 
about legislative behavior in multilevel systems. In order to tackle this uncertainty, it is 
necessary to understand how the Argentine system works. 
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The Argentine Case 
Argentina is a presidential republic with a federal structure of government. It has 
a symmetric bicameral legislature, 24 provinces (more specifically, 23 provinces plus an 
autonomous capital city that functions similarly to a province) and about 2200 
municipalities. After the discredit of the legalist views highlighting a unitary 
performance (Frias 1986, Bidart Campos 1993), it became common knowledge among 
scholars that Argentina is among the most federal countries in the world (Jones 2002; 
Benton, 2003; Saiegh 2005; Calvo and Escolar, 2005). In fact, many relevant political and 
economic decisions are made at the provincial level, such as candidate designation and 
selection (De Luca 2004; De Luca, Jones and Tula 2002), the design and reform of 
provincial institutions (Calvo and Micozzi, 2005), and the determination of the amount 
and destination of a majority of government spending (Eaton, 2002, 2004; Remmer and 
Wibbels, 2000, Remmer and Gelineau, 2003). For example, during the nineteen-nineties 
and the early XXI century, almost the same share of the distribution of expenditures was 
in the hands of the federal government and the provinces (Spiller and Tommasi 2005). 
For instance, "a 52% of expenditures were carried out by the national government, 40% by the 
provincial governments, and 8% by the municipal governments in 2000" (Tommasi 2002). 
At the provincial level, most of these roles are concentrated in the hands of their 
principal actors: the governors. Given the aforementioned distribution of political and 
economic power, governors are likely to have considerable influence over federal 
politics. In the same line, it is a significant fact that almost every elected office is chosen 
at the provincial level in Argentina4. As Figure 3.1 shows, the territorial division of 
Councilmen, mayors, provincial deputies and senators, federal representatives, federal senators and 
governors are chosen either at large or within the boundaries of each province. 
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elected offices is bounded by the provincial limits (dark perimeter). Only presidents are 
chosen at large in the country; any other federal positions (national Deputies and 
Senators) are elected by the citizens of each of the provinces at large. In parallel, the 
constituencies of provincial-level positions vary across provinces. While every province 
chooses its governor at-large, considerable variation in the selectorates for Provincial 
Deputies and Senators exist (see Figure 2)5. Municipal mayors, of course, are also elected 
in within-province constituencies. So, the core of the whole set of nationwide elected 
positions takes place at the provincial level. Appointed offices such as provincial or 
municipal ministers, secretaries or advisors also involve subnational dynamics. If, as 
stated, different levels of government are de facto politically linked, then territorial 
politics is likely to be a substantive concern for every career-seeking politician. 
5
 See Escolar & Calcagno (2003). 
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Figure 3.1: Territorial Division of Argentina - Provinces and Departments 
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Figure 3.2: Territorial Division of Argentina - Constituencies for Provincial 
Deputies and Senators 
Deputies 
S=Mixed-Member 
Systems (Second tier 
at-large) 
Source: Escolar and Calcagno (2003) 
Like the U.S., careers usually start in a lower (provincial or municipal) level and 
continue in different offices (Jones et. al 2002). The first step in the electoral career of a 
typical politician in Argentina takes often place at the municipal level. Provincial politics 
are likely to be the next stage. Time, efforts, resources, and bargaining are required 
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before reaching the national arena6. Elected offices in Argentina are reached through 
parties, which have the monopoly of candidacies7. Even though politicians have not 
always pursued careers within the same party, they need to be enrolled in a party at 
each stage. Parties choose candidates, run internal elections, organize factions, make 
collective decisions, fire (or later forgive) cheaters and approve alliances. As mentioned, 
most of these intraparty activities take place at the provincial level. As a consequence of 
the almost necessary province-level political activity required to develop a typical 
career, national level politics is profoundly affected by subnational forces in Argentina. 
The Theoretical Puzzle 
As the specialized literature demonstrated, subnational political strength is 
connected with legislative dynamics at the federal level. Candidate selection 
mechanisms are partisan but take place at the provincial level for different elected 
positions (De Luca & al. 2002, Jones 2008). Since subnational actors (i.e. governors or 
local bosses) generally determine legislators' futures, current federal representatives 
should be responsive to their leaders in equilibrium. Jones (1997), Morgenstern (2004) 
and Jones, Hwang and Micozzi (2009) point out that discipline and party unity are high 
in the House. Jones and Hwang (2005) find that provincial party machines delegate 
power in the leadership of the Chamber of Deputies to get their policies passed; implicit 
to this is the presence of strict party discipline, enforced both by the majority party 
6
 Jones (2002) shows that provincial deputy is the most common category help by politicians before getting 
a seat in the Federal House 
7
 Recently, well-known outsiders (i.e. technocrats, social leaders or soccer club presidents) have created 
their own parties to run for elective positions. Nevertheless, this tendency is more typical of the City of 
Buenos Aires than representative of the whole country. Very popular outsiders decided to join already 
existing parties and developed national careers within those (i.e. Daniel Scioli, Ramon Ortega, Domingo 
Cavallo or Carlos Reutemann) 
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leadership and by the shadow of future careers8. Every time the principals (governors, 
local leaders) want a piece of legislation passed, the majority party should act as a Cartel 
(Jones and Hwang 2005)9. The price of defection would not only be the individuals' 
removal from positions of power within the House and the party; but also strong 
constraints for their careers' progression under the same subnational coalition of power. 
In sum, if it is true that current legislators care about the future of their careers, they 
should be responsive to the desires of their leaders during their legislative tenure. 
Additionally, given the characteristics of the electoral rules (closed party lists, 
proportional representation, thresholds and moderate to low district magnitudes), most 
of the theoretical literature (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Carey and Shugart 1995, 
Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, Crisp et al 2005) would predict considerable levels of 
party discipline in Argentina- a claim verified by the empirical literature on the 
Argentine Congress (Mustapic 1998, Jones 1997, 2002). Leaders controlling a small set of 
fixed positions in party ballots are likely to have control of candidates' expected future 
behavior; in contrast with the higher degrees of freedom of individuals chosen in open 
lists. Electoral thresholds and small district magnitudes also reduce the incentives for 
running outside the party. If parties matter (as no serious study in the literature has 
denied) and labels are cues for voters (Popkin 1991), running outside the party lowers 
the chances of winning a spot; which might be different if district magnitude was high 
and parties with minimal shares could get a seat. All these rules and dynamics reinforce 
the strength of subnational leaders and their control over current national legislators, 
8
 If legislators are likely to continue in politics, leaders can enforce discipline by punishing defectors at 
further stages of candidate selection or executive branch appointment process. Anticipating those future 
vetoes for their careers, legislators should stay responsive to the leaders in equilibrium. 
9
 The question of how would a dispute among principals with different preferences be solved deserves a 
separate analysis. 
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concomitantly decreasing the pressures (and opportunities) for congressmen's 
personalization. 
However, the same political and institutional constraints might create exactly 
opposite pressures. Given that just one in four (26%) deputies obtains a place on the 
ballot after four years in office, and only one in five (20%) is reelected; current 
representatives need to act prospectively if they want to secure their political futures. 
Even though their current position is likely to be the product of the leaders' conformity, 
legislators will not obtain desirable political positions in the future without developing a 
reputation appropriate to their career goals. It might be somehow unrealistic to think 
that current legislators would simply rely on their party superiors' benevolence. 
Governors and party leaders are not altruistic actors; rather, they also make calculations 
when allocating positions such as a place in party lists for different positions. Loyalty is 
a valid capital to be considered for a further position; however, politics usually involves 
more than mere consideration as "a nice guy". Politicians are more likely to be 
considered for future positions if they can show a political capital that makes them a 
relevant political actor. Political capital can be constructed in many ways: money, votes, 
reputation, recognition, or responsiveness, among others. So, if legislators care about 
their future, shouldn't they try to build credible political capital? 
Considering that almost every elected office (and an overwhelming majority of 
appointed positions) is chosen within the provinces, legislators have clear incentives to 
create a reputation and support bases among certain groups of constituents. That capital 
might not only benefit a politician's electoral performance in the future, but would also 
signal party comrades. The question that becomes salient here is what (and how many) 
resources can a legislator count with to broaden her capital during her tenure. The 
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answer is conclusive: a single backbencher has very limited resources during her 
mandate. Her budget does not exceed several airline tickets to travel to her home 
province, the salaries of staff members and advisors (no more than four or five), some 
pensions and grants and, of course, a salary and some additional economic benefits. 
Nothing very impressive for creating, maintaining or increasing support networks in the 
provinces. This is probably one of the sources of the relatively poor role of Congress as a 
career step; and it may also partially explain the low reelection rates in Argentina. In 
contrast, occupying a subnational executive provides a more favorable set of incentives. 
Specifically, governorships- rather than representatives or senators- are considered the 
second most powerful position after the presidency (Benton 2003; Jones, Saiegh, Spiller 
and Tommasi 2007)10. With a higher degree of variation, something similar can be said 
about mayors. Even though they are far from being as powerful as province-level 
executives, municipal mayors may also handle more and better resources than a mere 
backbencher in the legislature. Compared to being the mayor of a district that has a 
budget for public works, services, health and transportation11, an ordinary seat in 
Congress seems to be just a small prize. Thus, it is a perfectly rational strategy for 
ambitious politicians to use Congress as a platform to become a municipal mayor12. 
See also Samuels (2003) for the same depiction of the Brazilian case. 
11
 Actually, there is an enormous degree of variation across provinces in terms of the municipal regime. 
This variation entails the number of municipalities, the degrees of autonomy, the population involved, the 
hierarchies, the powers for managing resources and the ability to design institutions, among others. For a 
good description of that variation, see Escolar and Calcagno (2003). 
2
 Of course, not every municipality is as big or has as many resources as described. Nevertheless, 
municipal executives can be very influential actors for provincial politics, with high chances of having a 
national projection. 
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Even though no explicit hierarchy among political positions can be recognized13, strong 
incentives to think on subnational executive offices do exist in Argentina. 
However, politicians do fill the 325 existing positions in the legislative branch. 
Once there, what can they do in order to improve their prospective positions? One of the 
best resources (and probably the prototypical asset) in the hands of a legislator is the 
obvious one: the ability to write legislation. By submitting bills, deputies and senators 
can target constituents and groups, highlight events, put issues and topics in the agenda 
and increase public knowledge of their "hard work on behalf of the citizens". One of the 
likely targets is the set of voters that might choose to appoint or dismiss them in a future 
candidacy. Following this reasoning, if the "shadow of the future" (Powell 1999) is 
present in their minds, they should try to anticipate their fate, writing, pushing, and 
submitting bills in order to claim credit and improve their prospective positions. This is 
not a unique feature of the Argentine case. Desposato and Crisp (2005) show how 
Colombian Senators increase the amounts of flights to their provinces to bolster their 
future electoral support. The American literature states that delivery of pork has a 
prospective goal. So, why shouldn't an Argentine Congressman maximize her available 
resources? 
If the ambition statements are right, legislation should reflect congressmen's 
future career goals. Thus, we should expect considerable efforts toward some forms of 
constituency service over the basis of the existing resources. Even though the 
characteristics of electoral institutions would not foresee high levels of personalization, 
13
 Mayors may withdraw from their positions to join a national legislative list. This may be even rational 
for the case of executives of big districts. Being at the top of a legislative list may mean that this politician 
became the principal political reference of the province, which may involve more benefits for a future 
career than sticking at the head of the municipality. 
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mixed incentives emerge from the structures of electoral federalism and the patterns of 
political progression. 
Towards and Integrated Understanding of Ambition and Legislative Performance in 
Argentina 
As mentioned, the most influential pieces on Argentine legislative politics have 
used a particular theoretical approach: cartel party theory14. Both Jones and Hwang 
(2005) and Calvo (2007) have demonstrated how the majority coalition and the 
governors use negative agenda controls to prevent any potentially harmful bill from 
reaching the floor. Therefore, the majority coalition's preferred policies should never be 
rolled on the floor. Their empirical evidence is conclusive and their findings have 
become standard knowledge. Therefore, at some point, their statements might work 
against my theoretical speculations. How would a cartelized, leadership-controlled 
behavior in Congress interact with the personalization requirements by rank-and-file 
members? 
Following Cox & McCubbins, party enforcement and individual careerism are 
not contradictory in any way; in fact, collective action is performed to solve collective 
action problems for every member's benefit. This is true in an environment like the U.S. 
House, where individual legislators are the basic sources of power and have to renew 
their mandates every two years. However, would that be the case in a party-based 
system with closed lists and provincial control of candidacies? Following Carey & 
Shugart (1995), Heitshusen, Young & Wood (2005) and Crisp et al (2005), the answer 
would surely be "no": institutional rules that concentrate power in the hands of party 
14
 See Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005). 
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leaders tend to decrease the incentives for legislators' individual credit claiming efforts. 
In addition, majoritarian internal rules such as a majority-controlled committee system 
(Aleman 2006, Aleman and Calvo 2008) would increase party controls over the flow of 
legislation traded. 
Nonetheless, the characteristics of the Argentine legislative system provide an 
ideal scenario to try to match these apparently contradicting principles. This 
opportunity is based on the existing distinction among the different kinds of legislation 
that can be introduced and passed in the House and Senate. Five types of legislation can 
be considered by Congress: presidential decrees, national bills, declarations, resolutions, 
and communications. 
Presidential decrees are mostly composed by requests of legislative agreement to 
appoint ambassadors or judges, and announcements of vetoes15. 
National bills involve major and general topics (i.e. budget, civil and penal law, 
regulations, or military decisions), and deal with most of the economic resources. These 
proposals match the category of "public bills"16 in the U.S. They can be submitted by the 
executive and by legislators, and are usually the sample used by scholars at the moment 
of explaining congressional performance. It is definitely true to state that legislators use 
most of the time in committees to discuss these bills and also that these pieces usually 
prompt the main struggles in legislative debates. However, without hindering their 
undeniable importance, they are not representative of the whole picture at the moment 
of speaking about the Argentine Congressional performance. 
15
 These decrees should not be confused with delegated decrees or constitutional decrees, which entail a 
different scope and salience. See Carey and Shugart (1998) and Negretto (2004) for a further discussion. 
16
 See Stein and Bickers (1994, 1996). 
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On the other hand, declarations, resolutions, and communications are the 
remaining kinds of bills. Their scope is more limited than national bills, especially 
relating the enforcement of their mandates. Specifically, these projects are 
recommendations to the other branches of power to do something specified in the bill. 
As examples, any single legislator can ask the executive to "allocate two million pesos in 
order to finish the road of Route 40" or to "give a $500 subsidy to the Athletic Association 
Taruca Pampa, Province of Tucuman". Even if passed, the Executive does not have to 
mechanically submit the money; the road may be paved and the Club may get the 
subsidy anyways, but not as a product of the approval of the bill. No judge will tell the 
executive to sign the check at all, and everyone understands that. In as much, these bills 
can be used as devices of accountability. Legislators can summon members of the other 
branches (i.e. Ministers or Secretaries) to give explanations to the floor or to committees. 
Another common use is the target of activities of different interest. Bill contents such as 
"Declare the City of Rosario the ^Hand-Made Ice Cream Capital", "Declare the agricultural 
emergency in the Province of Santa Fe", "Declare of National Interest the Third National 
Conference of Environmental Protection" or "Suspend the demotion to the second division of 
soccer teams for the 1983/84 season" are examples of how legislation is used to highlight 
groups, activities and places. Their nature is "private" (they do not attain major national 
goals), but their nature differs from the notion of private legislation used in American 
politics. Since the effects of submitting and having these pieces passed involves more 
signaling, targeting, and credit claiming for campaigns than "bringing home the bacon", 
they cannot technically be considered "pork" 17. Therefore, I decided to call them "non-
public bills". 
17
 The distribution of resources to provinces, districts and municipalities is channeled through negotiations 
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Usually overlooked by the literature18, declarations, resolutions and 
communications have not been included in the samples of most analyses. In fact, Jones & 
Hwang's analysis is based on estimations of roll call votes. No one doubts the relevance 
of roll call voting, but the sample of bills that actually goes to roll call is extremely low19. 
The mentioned piece has a sample of 473 bills between 1989 and 2003, while about 
26,000 national bills have been treated and about 2,000 have been passed during that 
period. If declarations, resolutions and communications are also counted, the number of 
bills introduced reaches 78,000, and about 30,000 of these are approved. In Calvo's 
study, only the set of presidential bills are used to test his hypotheses. Even though the 
sample is fully adequate for his research goals (rate of presidential bills' approval), it 
only considers 2,969 of the 177,302 bills that have been submitted to the Argentine 
Congress between 1983 and 2007. Far from thinking that the choice of the samples 
invalids the findings of the aforementioned pieces; I do believe that a comprehensive 
depiction of the workings of the Argentine Congress requires an analysis that includes 
the full sample of legislation introduced in the period. 
The use of all the kinds of legislation can be useful for several goals* First, 
looking at the whole picture can be better forged; in as much, it avoids any kind of 
selection bias in the choice of the sample. Second, it lets me reconcile the party-level 
arguments of the previous literature with an individual-level approach that has been 
overlooked until now. Analyzing all kinds of legislation will contribute to the 
understanding of congressional performance in a case where subjects are strongly 
between governors (and sometimes mayors) and officers of the executive branch (ministers or secretaries of 
Infrastructure, Finances or Internal Affairs). See Tommasi (2002) and Spiller and Tommasi (2007) for a 
good discussion. 
8
 Calvo (2007) calls them "minor bills with a symbolic value" 
19
 See Carubba et al (2006) for a good discussion about use of roll-call and selection biases. 
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constrained by external pressures, but where they also have to care about their 
individual futures. Thus, holding the assumption that legislators can use these pieces to 
improve their own reputation puts this piece in the big puzzle that has already 
demonstrated the existence of party controls, majoritarian legislative performance and 
subnational sources of federal power. 
Table 3.2: Composition of the Bills submitted to the Congress -1983-2007 
By Kind of Bill 
Type 
Executive Decrees 
National Laws ("Public") 
Communications 
Declarations 
Resolutions 
"Non-Public Bills" 
Total 
N 
2,397 
46,965 
20,841 
49,194 
57,865 
127,900 
177,302 
Percent 
1.35 
26.49 
11.75 
27.75 
32.64 
72.14 
100 
Source: Official Statistics of the Camara the Diputados 
Political Goals, Credit-Claiming and Legislative Activity 
It was stated above that declarations, resolutions, and communications are 
frequently used by rank-and-file legislators to create a political capital that helps them 
further their political goals. So, the expectation is that writing legislation might increase 
their chances of claiming credit vis-a-vis their constituents and also provincial party 
leaders. However, recalling the literature, agenda controls do exist (Aleman 2006). In 
fact, the rates of passage of these bills still remain low. As Table 3.3 shows, although 
their chances of approval are much higher than those of national bills; declarations and 
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resolutions are still around the 30% in their probabilities of passage. Communications, as 
it can be seen, have a substantively higher rate; nevertheless, they still are a small part of 
the sample. Considering that chances of getting a bill passed are not high overall; the 
question of why a legislator should submit these pieces becomes crucial. It has been 
stated that targeted pieces of legislation are likely to improve politicians' reputations 
and facilitate their career goals. But what happens if these politicians cannot 
systematically show any result to their constituents? 
Table 3.3: Rate of Passage of Legislation -1983-2007 
By Kind of Bill 
Type of Bill 
Executive Decrees 
National Laws 
Communications 
Declarations 
Resolutions 
"Non-Public Bills" 
Total 
Passed 
869 
36.25 
3,049 
6.49 
13,089 
62.8 
17,818 
36.22 
17,115 
29.58 
48,022 
37.55 
51,940 
29.3 
Not Passed 
1,528 
63.75 
43,916 
93.51 
7,752 
37.2 
31,376 
63.78 
40,750 
70.42 
79,878 
62.45 
125,322 
70.7 
Total 
2,397 
100 
46,965 
100 
20,841 
100 
49,194 
100 
57,865 
100 
127,900 
100 
177,262 
100 
Source: Official Statistics of the Camara the Diputados 
My intuition is that submission of that legislation does not necessarily imply an 
expectation of passage. Since no real barriers to the submission of bills do exist20, 
inflating the number of submitted bills give legislators some capital to show to their 
See Doring (1995) for an excellent review of the many restrictions for the introduction of private bills 
worldwide. 
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selectorate11. Ames (2001) shows a very similar pattern for the behavior of Brazilian 
deputies22. So, I will maintain the assumption that the mere submission of bills can 
contribute to the credit claiming of every individual legislator. In the next chapters, I 
will empirically assess to what extent targeted bill submission is linked with past career 
background, and also with further career ambitions. 
Conclusion 
For its institutional and behavioral characteristics, Argentina is an excellent case 
to test hypotheses about multi-level career perspectives and legislative performance. 
Given the multi-tier structure of political careers and the subnational anchors of even 
federal politics; activities performed to create subnational support should be the 
expected outcome of political efforts in Argentina. Taking the lack of static ambition in 
Congress and the needs of keeping districts as references into account, legislative efforts 
should be devoted to targeting voters, groups and provincial leaders. In the next 
chapters, I will empirically assess the validity of this statement. 
21
 This intuition has been subject to empirical verification through in-depth interviews with Argentine 
legislators. Without expectations of generalization, the reasoning was consistent with most of 
representatives' revealed experiences. 
22
 The so called "avulsos" (tickets proving the submission of a bill) are the evidence that legislators use to 
show responsiveness during campaigns. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Strategy 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I describe the strategies I have used to create my variables of 
interest over the basis of the available information. Relevant measurement and 
operationalization challenges appeared during the process of coding and capturing the 
pieces of information I am interested in. For the sake of reliability, I have tried to use 
previous work in the discipline as a proxy for my own decisions. 
Legislative Performance 
The main question of this project is how career decisions affect legislative 
performance. As mentioned in the previous chapters, this inquiry has been already 
posed for systems with different institutional settings. In the background of the 
literature in American politics, the notion of legislators delivering bills that target their 
current or prospective constituents is underlying. Different measures have been used as 
indicators of that behavior, such as the amounts of money transferred (Stein and Bickers 
1994,1995), the relative congruence of policy and opinion (Erikson, Wright, and Mclver 
1993), the overall number of bills submitted (Schlesinger 1966; Prewitt and Nowlin 1969; 
Van Der Slik and Pernacciaro 1979), public position taking (Highton and Rocca 2005) 
and the number of speeches and amendments offered relevant to public bills (Cook 
1986, Hibbing 1986). Over the basis of the single-member districts structure, it is quite 
easy to recognize the delivery of targeted policies by the delegate of the constituency. 
Beyond the U.S. federal House, studies that have analyzed singular legislative 
outputs out of individuals' ambitions do not abound. However, interesting approaches 
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have dealt with variation in the kinds of legislation submitted. Taylor-Robinson and 
Diaz's (1999) foundational piece verifies that Honduran legislators do not submit 
particularistic bills to target constituents; rather, this activity is mostly performed by the 
president. This work entails a substantive contribution to the empirical analysis of 
legislative performance in presidential regimes, as the authors coded about 2.000 bills 
over the basis of the level of aggregation and effect of the -proposal. Thereafter, different 
pieces have distinguished among kinds of bills. Crisp et al. (2004) distinguish between 
targetable and non-targetable bills to verify the effects of the personal vote in ten Latin 
American Chambers. Molinas, Perez Linan and Saiegh (2004) studied the different 
chances of passage depending on the bill's intent and scope. Mejia-Acosta, Perez Linan 
and Saiegh (2006) have analyzed the effects of different electoral rules over the 
submission of particularistic bills in Paraguay and Ecuador, differentiating proposals by 
type of public policy and policy target. More recently, Gamm and Kousser (2007) have 
created a database of 170.000 bills introduced in American State legislatures and 
distinguished them among special (local-particular), general local and statewide bills. 
For this research project, the strategy I chose to deal with legislative production 
is similar to those of the aforementioned articles, but adding an innovation: rather than 
classifying the bills by their scope and aggregation23; I am interested in capturing the 
territorial destination of the content of the bill. In particular, I am not just trying to 
disentangle whether a single piece targets a province or a municipality. Rather, I will 
recognize what municipality (or municipalities) and/or what province (or provinces) 
are being mentioned in the content of a legislative project. This strategy demands huge 
efforts and seems extremely time consuming, but it is the most reliable approach I 
231 already conducted that strategy in Micozzi (2006) 
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figured out to deal with my research question. Once I have got that information, I will be 
able to recognize whether any legislator with territorial ambition has increased the 
delivery of bills targeting her prospective constituency24. 
In order to discriminate these data, I had to gather the information about the 
bills. Fortunately, the complete records of legislative submission are publicly available in 
the webpage of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies (www.hcdn.gov.ar). I was able to 
gather data of each of the 178.119 bills introduced in the House or the Senate between 
December 18th and October 9th 2007, which made it possible to work with the most 
complete existing database of the Argentine Congress25. Each observation (a bill) has 
information at different levels: 
• Bill-level: it includes the date of submission, final status (stacked in 
Committees, half-sanction, withdrawn, rejected, or passed), date of 
passage (if approved) number of committees (House and Senate), number 
of sponsors, and also the title and description of the content. 
• Legislator-level: information about the name, party membership, province, 
tenure, committee membership, committee chairmanship, membership to 
the president's party, the majority and/or her province's governor party, 
and Chamber's authority position are included 
• Province-level: District magnitude for federal Deputies and Provincial 
Deputies, the effective number of competing parties for both categories, 
and information about provincial electoral systems are incorporated. 
24
 This strategy has some points in common with Carey's (1996) strategy to uncover legislators' bailiwicks 
in Costa Rica. However, the scope of my sample is clearly much bigger than thepartidas especiales he 
analyzes. 
25
 Ernesto Calvo deserves substantial credit for the creation of this database. 
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• Congress-level: Percentage of seats of the most relevant parties, percentage 
of provincial governors of the principal parties, divided government, 
honeymoon years and the effective number of blocs are part of the 
database. 
This exhaustive data collection gave me material to test multiple assertions about 
the Argentine congress. However, for the sake of the improvement of controls at the 
individual-level, I decided to include the estimates of the first-dimension ideal points 
derived from cosponsorship26. This should exhaust the set of covariates I might put on 
the right side of my equations; and also let me generate my dependent variables in a 
correct manner. 
Career Ambition 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the origins of the most popular literature about 
political ambition lie in American politics. Not only have the theoretical notions been 
exported to comparative settings, but also the indicators and the approach to empirically 
assess hypotheses. The almost "natural" way of dealing with careerism has been simple 
and predictable for the U.S. Congress: look at the incumbent's primary, regard the 
challenger party's primary and then observe the patterns of continuity or disruption in 
the general election (Cox and Katz 2002). Once the sight was put over progressive 
ambition, it became forceful to track people's trajectory in different offices, at different 
levels and in different time points. Of course, this made things harder. Even though data 
26
 Estimations are reported in Aleman, Calvo, Jones and Kaplan (2009). This paper also demonstrates that 
ideal points derived from roll-call analysis and cosponsorship don't show any substantive difference for the 
Argentine case. 
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collection required time and precision, nothing prevented authors like Squire (1988) 
from getting the records about what positions have lower-level politicians won in higher 
tiers. 
However, there is a theoretical question that deserves substantial attention: how 
should ambition be measured? It is clear that a politician that won a spot in the Federal 
House and previously had a seat in a local council has had progressive ambition. The 
question is whether only those who succeeded in a higher office race should be 
considered ambitious. In other words, looking just at the winners might create a severe 
selection bias; had the runner up of that race been another councilman, it is doubtful that 
she would had been less ambitious than the new U.S. representative. 
The other question posed has to do with the stage that should be looked at. 
Specifically, is just a contender in the general election ambitious? Would that same 
candidate have been less ambitious had he lost the primary? I suggest that explicit 
internal competition is a sufficient condition to recognize patterns of ambition in any 
politician. The discussion does not exhaust at that stage, anyways. A politician may 
really aspire to a particular spot and behave strategically in order to win it. However, 
different factors such as incumbency advantage, lack of money or information about 
expected poor performance may deter her from running for the position before the 
primary. Is that evidence of no ambition, or a realistic calculation about costs and 
benefits? 
My criterion tries to reconcile precision and feasibility. Thus, I decided to include 
in the sample of ambitious politicians all those subjects who ran in an election for an 
executive position; also, subject to data availability, I thought considering those 
politicians who lost a primary for a mayoral or gubernatorial position as ambitious, too. 
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I also evaluated including public announcements about career intentions, but this 
measure is likely to be excessively subject to speculations and false statements that 
might over represent the sample. 
Unfortunately, access to the data was not as easy as for legislative information. 
Unlike the case of Brazil, where Federal Courts organize elections and keep a unified 
record of candidates and officers (which let Samuels easily collect the data about 
subnational positions), province-level Judges are responsible for the organization and 
administration of elections. Therefore, information is spread out across multiple units 
that are not coordinated by a Federal agency. Thus, the consequence is predictable: no 
systematic official records actually exist, not only for candidates for subnational 
positions, but also for those elected. Believe it or not, the Argentine state does not have a 
list of the mayors, and governors across time. Thus, the first challenge was to gather the 
information of those names. The second defy was to get the data about mayoral and 
gubernatorial candidates. 
For the former goal, I combined information from the Direction of Municipal 
Affairs (Direccion de Asuntos Municipales) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with other 
secondary sources, such as documents from the archive of the National Electoral 
Direction, NGO's information (CIPPEC), and previous databases used in Jones et al 
(2002) and Cao (1999). Relying on these resources, and even recognizing that perfection 
has not been reached yet, I created the only existing database of governors and mayors 
between 1983 and 2008 in Argentina. 
In order to fulfill the second goal, I pursued different strategies. First, I contacted 
the provincial Judges and asked them data about candidates. Just two provincial Courts 
positively answered and submitted the records to me (Buenos Aires and Santa Fe). For 
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the rest, I did not have alternatives: I had to take pictures of the ballots. The problem is 
that not every single ballot of the last 25 years is stored in one place. A substantive 
proportion of them (about a 60%) were available in the Archives of the National 
Electoral Courts, the office of the judicial branch that oversees that every candidate to 
national-level office fulfills all the legal requirements. Despite they do not rule over 
subnational positions, the structure of the ballot in Argentina made my task easier. As it 
can be seen in Figure 4.1, party ballots have candidacies for multiple offices attached 
when those elections are concurrent. Thus, the official records of the national legislative 
elections included a considerable proportion of the data I needed. I took about 12.000 
pictures of these ballots and complemented the sample with pictures of ballots stored in 
the mentioned archive at the National Electoral Direction. 
After having taken all the pictures, I still lacked data for several elections. In 
order to fill the blanks, I have browsed provincial newspapers in dates close to the 
elections. Doing so, I got most of the data I needed. For the remaining missing 
observations, I contacted specialists in the provinces, and also used Google. These 
complementary sources also helped me collect other kinds of useful data, such as the 
identification of relatives that have occupied the same executive position across time27. 
Four months after the starting date, I had gathered the information about a 100% of the 
gubernatorial candidates and a 90% of the mayoral candidates in Argentina between 
1983 and 2008. Most of the missing information has to do with the existence of the so 
called "Ley de Lemas" (double simultaneous cumulative vote, see Tula 1998) in some 
provinces, where more than one candidate per party could run for a specific position. 
27
 It was necessary to confirm whether people with the same last name were actually relatives; in some 
other cases, spouses of past officers did not use the same last name as their couples, which involved an 
additional effort. Something similar can be said about uncles-nephews. 
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In addition to my own data, I could count with Miguel De Luca's (2004) database 
on candidate selection mechanisms for governors. However, given the temporal breaks 
of his analysis, I would have had to dismiss data after 2003. Since my idea is to test the 
whole democratic period between 1983 and 2007,1 made the choice of not using this 
information, and just rely on data on effective candidacy in general elections as the 
proxy for ambition. Further stages of this project will collect the missing data to 
complete the sequence of subnational pre-candidacies. 
Figure 4.1: Party Strip Ballot for the 1999 Elections - Province of Mendoza 
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Having collected all the required information, I still have to develop the right 
variables to test my theoretical questions. I am interested in unfolding legislative 
behavior conditional to political ambition, especially when it is linked to subnational 
executive positions. As mentioned, I have two variables (title and description) which 
include information about the content of each bill. Hence, in order to create my main 
covariates, I need to capture what territorial reference is being targeted in the legislative 
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proposals. To do so, I created one variable per province, and also one for each existing 
municipality. For the provincial level, I created 24 dummy variables, each of which 
equals 1 if the name of the district of interest is mentioned in the title or description of 
the bill, and 0 otherwise28. For the case of the municipalities, the number of variables 
equals 2.223, a quantity that keeps track of every single ever-existing municipality in 
Argentina for the last 25 years29. Some additional refinements have been necessary; since 
several municipalities have the same name (i.e. five are called "Hipolito Yrigoyen", "San 
Pedro" and "Santa Ana"), I needed to clearly specify other conditions to allow a correct 
discrimination. In as much, wording made the task complicated, as strings may be 
differently specified, or may include mistakes that make it hard to be recognized by 
Stata (as an example, if a district called "Saint John's" is spelled "St. John's", "St Johns", 
or "Saint Johns", the program will recognize three dissimilar districts). Thus, double, 
triple and quadruple checks became necessary. 
The next step was to identify what legislators have had some kind of subnational 
ambition, either having won or having pursued a mayoral or a gubernatorial position. 
Over the basis of the two databases I created, I identified in what year a legislator ran for 
mayor or governor, and in what year she won it (if she did). Doing so, I could then 
verify whether it was before or after her congressional mandate. This let me also identify 
the home district of every legislator that ran for mayor, in order to link the content of the 
bills and the territorial target. Doing so, I also created a variable called "relative", where 
I identified whether the Congressman has a tie to any territorially concentrated power. 
Even though a legislator with that profile may not necessarily have the ambition of 
28
 State's command strpos was extremely useful for that task 
29
'Municipal structure changed across time in Argentina. New districts have been created, some others have 
been split into two or more, and others were merged. 
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becoming a mayor; she might submit legislation to her district, with the goal of 
expanding the familiar local cluster of power. 
Overcoming Selection Bias 
As mentioned, one of the challenges of the coding scheme is the identification of 
those bills submitted by a legislator i that target her district of reference. For the case of 
the province-level targets, the mechanism is straightforward: it is known in advance 
what province each legislator belongs to, and also for which one she has run or plans to 
compete. However, for municipal targets, things become more complicated. As already 
pointed out, American legislators, in as much as their British, Australian, Canadian, 
Zambian and Botswana's colleagues, are elected in single member districts. Even though 
legislative and municipal boundaries may not coincide, it would be easier to find out 
what the district of reference of each legislator might be. However, in countries where 
legislators are elected at large, or in states or provinces, home district identification is 
tougher. There is only one source of certainty and is limited to a particular group: by 
definition, those representatives who have run for a mayoral position can be attached to 
that district. However, what about the rest? It heavily relies on the availability of 
information of each case. 
In Argentina, some politicians' territorial pertinence is public and clear; some 
others, even though they may have established closed ties with a particular district, may 
have not communicated it with a substantial emphasis. In parallel, a particular group of 
politicians do not have such a strong municipality-based attachment, either because they 
are purely national politicians, outsiders, technocrats, delegates of interest groups (i.e. 
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labor or agricultural unions), or simply belong to the City of Buenos Aires30. Thus, it is 
complicated to attach a specific legislator that has not run for a subnational spot to a 
particular municipality. Different sources such as newspapers, internet, speeches or 
campaign activities might serve as proxies; however, the reliability of the information is, 
at least, non-systematic, and it becomes harder to get as legislators' terms have taken 
place longer before. I attempted to follow this strategy with the Province of Buenos 
Aires, and about 30% of the sample remained blank. This province is the biggest and 
also the one where most newspapers and media coverage exist. Thinking on gathering 
this information in smaller, less urban and poorer districts seem to bring even less 
substantial results. 
In as much, the coexistence of reliable information with other derived from 
diffuse sources is likely to add some kind of systematic noise. One alternative to that 
might be working only with those legislators that have run for a subnational position. 
However, this dependent variable-based choice would seriously bias the sample (King, 
Keohane and Verba 1994). Doing so, I would not be able to capture the expected effect of 
non-candidacy over legislative submission. Thus, the most feasible alternative I found 
was to make a strong assumption; Given that I identified whether a municipality is 
targeted in a bill, and I also know to that province this municipality belongs to; I coded 
the variable with a 1 if it mentioned a municipality of the province of the bill's sponsor. 
The strong assumption made is that targets to different municipalities of the province 
are normally distributed around the mean, which is where the home municipality is 
30
 The City of Buenos Aires used to be a federal district. Even though it does not have a full provincial 
status, it gained autonomy in 1996 and is now closer to a province than to a municipality. Nevertheless, it 
does not have any municipal structure yet. That does not mean that legislators from the City of Buenos 
Aires do not do territorial work in the neighborhoods; however, for the goals of this project, it is technically 
impossible to link them with a particular territorial unit. 
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located. I am aware mat the strategy is not perfect, and that the optimal estimation 
would have to include the home district of every single legislator. However, this 
measure is the best available by now. 
Sample Choice 
As frequently pointed out in the previous paragraphs, I gathered information 
about every single bill introduced in the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 2007.1 
also described the bicameral structure of that legislative branch, highlighting that it is 
symmetric and non-congruent. Many pieces in the literature have dealt with the 
dynamics in the House (Jones 1997, 2002; Mustapic 2002, Jones and Hwang 2005, 
Aleman 2006, Aleman and Calvo 2008, Jones, Hwang and Micozzi 2008), while the 
Senate remained comparatively poorly explored (Llanos 2003 and Kikuchi and Lodola 
2009 are a few exceptions). Thus, the advantage of working with the House is that the 
expectations about patterns of functioning, the effects of internal rules and the basic 
legislative performance are, at some point, predictable. On the contrary, uncertainty is 
the rule in the Senate. Even though I do not deny what an important contribution the 
link between careers and legislative performance in a typically territorial Chamber 
would be 31; I will limit the scope of the current project to the analysis of the House. 
Thus, I will not consider the observations of bills submitted by a Senator, which 
completely removes communications from the sample. 
Similarly, I find nonsense to keep legislation submitted by the president in the 
sample. I do not care about the presidential delivery of targeted legislation for many 
reasons. First, I am looking at the impact of ambition over legislative performance. So 
31
 This analysis is a logical extension of this dissertation and will be surely developed in further years. 
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far, no president has had any kind of immediate subnational ambition after his tenure, 
with the exception of Carlos Menem in 2007, eight years after leaving the presidency. 
Second, in a clear difference with the aforementioned case of Honduras analyses by 
Taylor-Robinson and Diaz (1999), legislative submission does not involve the core of the 
budgetary resources. Instead, presidents and their ministers can allocate funds through 
other administrative channels. Hence, why should I look at non-public presidential bills 
for this project? 
After debugging the sample, I maintained the remaining 117.249 national bills, 
declarations and resolutions submitted by legislators in the period. It is noteworthy to 
mention that 33.661 bills (a 28.7%) have some kind of territorial target. Consistent with 
the expectations mentioned in Chapter 3, declarations and resolutions have a much 
higher proportion of territorial targets. As it can be read in Table 4.1, just a 15% of 
national bills involve any kind of provincial or municipal reference. In contrast, 
resolutions target twice as much (almost a 30%), while four of each declarations makes 
an allusion to subnational units. 
Table 4.1: Percentage of Bills with a territorial Target - By Type of Bill 
Type With Target Without Target Total 
National Bills 
Resolutions 
Declarations 
Total 
4,752 
14.35 
14,768 
29.6 
14,141 
41.29 
33,661 
28.71 
28,365 
85.65 
35,118 
70.4 
20,105 
•58.71 
83,588 
71.29 
33,117 
100 
49,886 
100 
34,246 
100 
117,249 
100 
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Conclusion 
Along this section, I have discussed the criteria I followed to make several 
choices about concepts and measurement strategies. After having made these decisions, 
it is completely clear what the meaning of each theoretical term is, as well as the 
indicators employed to measure each of them. Over these bases, I will proceed to test my 
theoretical hypotheses in the next chapters. 
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Chapter 5: How Career Background affects Legislative Performance 
Securing the Past, securing the Future 
Along this dissertation, it was stated in several opportunities that a substantive 
part of the sources of political power in Argentina is subnational, even for national-level 
positions. In consequence, I posited that politicians have strong incentives to create ties 
with voters, groups and territorially delimited support bases if they want to secure a 
future in politics. Sometimes, the immediate political expectation involves an executive 
office, sometimes a legislative position, or maybe some other spot that does not directly 
depend on electoral votes (i.e. minister or advisor). However, even the pursuit of these 
non-elected positions is more likely to succeed if a politician can demonstrate a political 
capital at me bargaining stage. 
Thus, ambition triggers the creation and improvement of local bases of support. 
However, conservation of what has been already won is also important. Nothing beats a 
politician who can show a bulletproof district when negotiating positions or threatening 
colleagues in an electoral race. For people with static ambition, the consequence of that 
strength should be permanent reelection. For progressively ambitious politicians, things 
get more complicated. Imagine, a prestigious mayor, who has been reelected several 
times/ now aspires to become a governor. In order to take that step, she might need to 
demonstrate that her reputation exceeds her district's boundaries. Thus, she might 
accept the challenge of running in the first place of the Federal Deputies' party list in the 
midterm elections. Meanwhile, someone else has filled her municipal position: a person 
of her confidence, a co-partisan with personal interests, a member of a different faction 
or simply a rival. In any of these possibilities, the ambitious politician is likely not to 
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forget what the source of her original power was: her district. Therefore, it is entirely 
rational that she tries to increase her presence (real or virtual) in her home territory. 
Once politicians have won an executive spot in a subnational unit, but still 
decide or have to move for any reason, they have strong incentives to act defensively. 
What is the meaning of defense? It simply refers to the ability to maintain the political 
capital created some time ago. It does not necessarily imply that the expectation must be 
to go back to the old spot; rather, it is a source that improves the chances of any kind of 
aspiration. Moving back might be one option, but not the only option. In any case, the 
strategic use of legislation sounds like a rational decision, following my theoretical 
perspective. 
Consistent with the repeated affirmation that local politics affect almost every 
political position in Argentina, it is reasonable to infer that most legislators should 
deliver some kind of territorially targeted legislation during their mandates, regardless 
of their past background and immediate ambition. When subnational ambition is taken 
into consideration, the intuition is that legislators with a territorial background face 
incentives to deliver even more policies than their colleagues. Following the theoretical 
speculations, legislators that have been governors or mayors in previous periods should 
be particularly interested in targeting their constituents during their congressional 
tenure at time t. 
Governor or Mayor: Does it make a Difference? 
I have already pointed out that subnational executives usually manage more 
resources for political careers than a legislative position in the federal arena. I also stated 
that governorships are the second most relevant position on the scale of elected offices in 
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Argentina. Clearly, the potential amount of resources to do politics is bigger in a 
governorship, but so are the numbers of possible contenders. In as much, on the scale of 
elected officials, the efforts, money and salience of a gubernatorial race are significantly 
greater than in a municipal race. As an extension, another substantive difference exists: 
the median voter. The set of potential targets of campaigns, discourses, pork and 
symbolic activities is clearly smaller and (presumably) less diverse in a mayoral race. On 
the contrary, a gubernatorial contest do not only involve dealing with general province-
level topics, but also probably with different "home styles" within the province. In sum, 
as a logical implication, a politician running for mayor is likely to face considerable 
different opportunities and pitfalls than a colleague pursuing a governorship. Following 
a similar logic, a gubernatorial background may also shape current legislators' behavior 
differently from that of former municipal executives. 
If career ambition and political backgrounds affect legislative behavior, and 
dissimilar subnational positions also make a difference, legislative activity should differ 
depending on legislators' previous position. While current legislators with a mayoral 
background should care more about their past locally bounded voters; those 
representatives that have been provincial executives should be more interested in 
targeting the province as a whole. These defensive actions should be reflected in the 
kinds of legislation they submit during their tenure. However, the expected support to 
the theoretical expectations is likely to differ between categories. In other words, the 
profiles of the typical politicians occupying a seat after a governorship and after a 
mayoral position usually differ in the Argentine case. 
Under what conditions should a mayor seek a legislative seat? As mentioned 
several earlier, the rationale behind a former mayor joining a legislative list might be 
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that she became the leader of the party at the provincial level and therefore occupies the 
top of the party list32. It can also be interpreted as the first step towards provincial-level 
recognition, consistent with gubernatorial expectations. Some other mayors may face 
intra-party challenges or credible threats in the general elections, and may strategically 
opt for a temporarily secure spot in the federal Congress. Another group of mayors may 
have been convoked by provincial leaders in order to create a reverse coattails effect with 
their presence (Ames 1992, Samuels 2001) and to increase the vote share of the party list. 
In any of the mentioned situations, that new legislator is still politically alive, since the 
upper bound of her career has not been reached yet. 
However, why should a governor expect a legislative seat? Two main arguments 
seem reasonable here: first, term limits may have removed her from the spot and she 
needs a temporary shelter, in order to re-run for the governorship. Second, that 
politician may be a political corpse, and the legislative spot was given to send her away 
from the province and secure a sweet transition to retirement. Any other realistic 
explanation should highlight some psychological or idiosyncratic factors of particular 
governors, which is largely beyond the goals of this project. Thus, why should former 
governors act strategically during their congressional tenure? What is their prospective 
goal? Politicians that faced term limits may still have career ambitions, and might 
therefore use legislation strategically. However, the degree of public knowledge about 
someone that has been a governor is, presumably, very high. In as much, the relative 
contribution of symbolic politics to a possible gubernatorial candidacy in the future 
might not be as powerful as in other circumstances. Even though the policies submitted 
32
 This is a claim verified by Deputy Omar De Marchi, who revealed having had exactly that motivation 
when he moved from his municipality to the House. Of course, this statement does not allow automatic 
generalization, but it confirms that this is a feasible reason to take that step. 
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to the provincial level could help her further career prospects, it is doubtful that these 
policies will make a difference in terms of voters' recognition and, especially, for intra-
party bargaining. For the rest of the former governors, I am doubtful about labeling 
them "ambitious politicians". Thus, overall, I do not expect the effect of previous 
governorships to be a very strong predictor of increments in the submission of 
provincially-targeted legislation. 
On the contrary, I think that former mayors do need territorial targets, not only 
to remain in their voters' minds, but also as signals to party leaders. Unlike former 
governors, the scope of their previous territorial support is more concentrated and less 
widespread across the province. In order to improve further chances, those politicians 
should be interested in demonstrating that the linkage with "their people" is untouched. 
Thus, I expect those politicians to act strategically, especially since returning to a district-
level position is a valid option for the future. For this reasons, the likelihood of 
submitted municipally-oriented legislation should increase if a legislator has had a 
municipal background. 
Descriptive Information 
What is the distribution of former governors in Congress? As mentioned in 
Chapter 3; about 30% of legislators have pursued (and some of them won) a 
gubernatorial or mayoral position. However, this measure considers the House and the 
Senate together and does not take timing into account. When background prior to the 
arrival to the House of Deputies is considered, statistics look as shown in Tables 5.1 to 
5.3. Fifty-six former Governors and Lieutenant Governors previously occupied a 
position in the Argentine House after serving their mandates, which is almost 4% of the 
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whole sample of legislators. Numbers change when I consider all provincial executive 
posts. Between 1983 and 2007, 324 positions for governor and vice-governor were 
elected. Given that some officers died, quit or have been impeached, the number of 
occupants33 of the positions reaches 345. However, since people have been repeatedly 
reelected, the real number of individuals that have been governors or vice-governors 
equals 242. Depending on what denominator is chosen, the percentage of former 
provincial executives that have become Deputies ranges between 18% and 24%, as 
showed in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.1: Percentage of Legislators that have previously been Provincial 
Executives -1983-2007 
Previous Governor 
0 
1 
Total 
1,444 
57 
1,501 
96.2 
3.8 
100 
Table 5.2: Percentage of Provincial Executives that jumped to the House 
of Deputies -1983-2007 (N=56) 
Denominator 
Spots 
Spots with Turnover 
Individuals 
324 
345 
242 
0.18 
0.17 
0.24 
In as much, it was stated that former governors facing term limits might behave 
different from those that did not face term limits. Thus, the relative proportion of these 
still (expected) active politicians over the whole sample is likely to make a difference for 
legislative activity. Looking at the distribution in Table 5.3, former governors who faced 
Each position i is a subject in one period. 
58 
term limits are less than a third of all of those who occupied a seat in the House. Thus, 
the aforementioned low expectation of substantive effects over congressional 
performance has more empirical arguments. 
Table 5.3: Percentage of Legislators that Jumped to the House 
immediately after being Term Limited -1983-2007 (N=56) 
Term Limits 
.. No Yes . Total 
39 
68.42 
18 
31.58 
57 
100 
At the mayoral side, a higher proportion of legislators have previously been 
municipal executives. 132 politicians comprise almost 9% of the legislative sample. In 
contrast, taking these individuals as a proportion of the existing mayoral positions 
(11,781 in the period in my sample), just 1.2% of mayors have jumped to the House. If 
the individual politicians that have been mayors are considered, then 1.9% of these 7,118 
have occupied a legislative spot in further periods. Of course, the sample of mayors is 
exponentially bigger than that of governors (2,210 vs. 24), which increases the static 
probability of any politician in the House having been a mayor rather than a governor. 
Table 5.4: Percentage of Legislators that have previously been 
Municipal Executives -1983-2007 
Previous Mayor Freq. Percent 
0 
1 
Total 
1,369 
132 
1,501 
91.21 
8.79 
100 
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Table 5.5: Percentage of Municipal Executives that jumped to the House 
of Deputies -1983-2007 (N=132) 
Denominator 
Mayoral Spots 
Individuals 
11,781 
7,118 
1.12 
1.85 
In any case, 12% of politicians that have ever served as Deputies have held a 
subnational executive experience before reaching the House. Thus, the scenario provides 
an excellent opportunity to test the theoretical intuitions stated above. Do career 
backgrounds affect legislative behavior? Three main hypotheses can be drawn from the 
aforementioned reasoning: 
5.1: Legislators that have occupied a municipal executive position before becoming 
congressmen tend to submit more municipality-level targeted bills than other legislators 
5.2: Legislators that have been governors before becoming congressmen do not submit a 
substantive higher proportion of province-level targeted legislation than other 
legislators 
5.3: Legislators that have been governors and became congressmen due to term limits do 
submit a higher proportion of province-level targeted legislation than other former 
governors 
Other complementary hypotheses can be drawn over the basis of the control 
variables. One is linked with the expected effects of the (ideological) distance of a single 
legislator to the majority party. Inflation in the submission of bills can also be thought 
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as a strategy to bypass the low expectations of bill passage34. As shown in Aleman and 
Calvo (2008), members of majority party are more likely to have bills passed. Thus, 
members of parties in the opposition might also increase the chances of submitting 
local legislation. 
5.4: The farther away is a legislator from the majority party median ideal point, the 
higher the chances of submitting locally-based legislation 
Something similar can be thought about Committee Chairs. As Aleman (2006) and 
Aleman and Calvo (2008) find, agenda controls affect the probability that a bill reaches 
the floor, and therefore that it is passed. If chances of passage might depress the rate of 
submission, Committee chairmanship might also be negatively related to the chances of 
writing bills. 
5.5: Committee Chairs are less likely to submit locally-based legislation 
Data and Estimations 
In order to empirically assess the validity of the mentioned hypotheses, I 
run several statistical models. As explained in Chapter 4,1 have gathered information at 
the bill, legislator and provincial level, where each observation is a bill i submitted by a 
legislator ; at time t. This legislator belongs to the province k, which has its own 
particular characteristics. Over that basis, my dependent variable captures whether a 
submitted bill involves a provincial or a municipal target. For the municipal hypothesis, 
the variable equals " 1 " if a municipality of the sponsor's province is mentioned in the 
content of the bill, and "0" otherwise35. For the governorship-related hypotheses, the 
As it can be remembered from Chapter 3, the overall chances of passage are 30%. 
I already discussed the pros and cons of this strategy in Chapter 4. 
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dependent variable equals "1" if the province of the sponsor is mentioned and "0" 
otherwise. 
My principal covariates lie at different levels of aggregation. For the municipal 
model, the first set, including the main predictor, belongs to the legislator-level: 
background as a mayor, pertinence to the majority party, pertinence to the governor's 
party in her province, absolute distance from the median ideal point in the floor, 
member of the Peronist party and member of a Provincial party. At the province-level, I 
include a main covariate that differentiates districts well: district magnitude for Federal 
Deputies. Since variation across provinces is huge in many aspects (institutions, political 
patterns of continuity, turnout), and a specification including every single factor would 
deviate the analysis from the main focus of this study; I prefer to let the estimations vary 
by province. Thus, I run a random intercept multilevel model that captures the 
province-specific effects over the likelihood of progressively ambitious politicians 
submitting targeted legislation. Given that the structure of the dependent variable is 
binary, I will use a Bernoulli- logistic function in the systematic component of my 
equations. As an alternative estimation, I use an ordinary logit model with legislator-
level clustered standard errors, in order to take individual-level variation into account. 
The clusters are made at the legislator-legislative period level (four years)36. The 
employment of these grouped errors lets me capture the legislator-to-legislator 
differences. Since I do not think that time makes any difference here (I am not theorizing 
any kind of learning process or a dependence of current values of past legislative 
activity),J am not including any time-series parameters. 
I thank Brian Crisp for pointing out the importance of running a model like this. 
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I replicate the same strategy for the province-level analysis, using gubernatorial 
background and the same control variables of the previous hypothesis on the right hand 
of the equation. As an addition, I am including a covariate measuring whether the 
former governor was removed from office due to term limits, in order to assess 
hypothesis 3. 
Results: Municipal Models 
Empirical tests provide a strong support to my first hypothesis. As Table 
5.6 shows, having been a mayor before jumping to the House increases the probability of 
submitting municipality-based legislation in a positive and statistically significant 
manner. Additionally, this evidence is robust across models. I computed predicted 
probabilities over the clustered standard errors for different conventional prototypes of 
legislators. In all of the cases, the expected increase in the probability of submitting 
legislation targeting municipalities of the home province exceeds 40% when a legislator 
has had a mayoral background. Table 5.7 captures the relatively small difference in 
probabilities when continuous variables are held at the mean, while party membership 
and committee chairmanship are varying. The highest relative increases in the chances 
of submitting local legislation are in hands of non-Peronists and non-provincial party 
legislators (thus, mostly members of the Radical party), especially if they are committee 
chairs. In other words, whenever a Radical or a Socialist have a local background, they 
submit 43% more municipality-targeted bills than if they did not. Something similar 
happens for both Peronists and provincial party members. Overall, the effect is 
consistent across categories. All of this can be taken as positive evidence of the defensive 
strategic behavior performed by former mayors. Targeting bills to their former 
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constituents seems to be a main strategy to maintain their political capital and improve 
their career perspectives. 
Table 5.6: Results of the Estimations 
Variables 
Previous Mayor 
Committee Chair 
Distance to Median 
Distance to Majority Median 
PJ member 
Provincial Party Member 
District Magnitude 
Constant 
Observations 
Random Intercept 
Pseudo-R2 
Clustered SE 
0.381*** 
(0.103) 
-0.336*** 
(0.089) 
-0.438*** 
(0.090) 
0.101 
(0.128) 
0.113 
(0.071) 
0.200 
(0.131) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-2.127*** 
(0.089) 
101533 
Random Intercept 
0.240 *** 
(0.037) 
-0.304 *** 
(0.034) 
0.055 
(0.05) 
-0.322 *** 
(0.037) 
-0.017 
(0.026) 
-0.078 
(0.060) 
0.027 *** 
(0.002) 
-2.826 *** 
(0.49) 
101533 
5.637 
(-2.374) 
0.010 
Table 5.7: Relative Changes in the Probabilities of submitting Local 
Bills if they have a Municipal Background 
Profiles Probability 
Other Parties, No Committee Chair 
Other Parties/ Committee Chair 
PJ, Committee Chair 
PJ, no Committee Chair 
Provincial Party, no Committee Chair 
0.431 
0.423 
0.421 
0.406 
0.401 
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Hypothesis 4 (ideological distance to the majority party) finds mixed results 
across models. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant for the clustered SE 
model, while it does not have any effect for the multilevel estimation. As a consequence, 
I do not find even a close support for my hypothesis, given that I expected a higher 
probability of strategic behavior as distance from majority party increased. A possible 
explanation may have to do with the fact that parties lying farther away from majority 
party tend to have weak territorial linkages (i.e. third forces from urban districts), and 
therefore do not concentrate so much time and effort in targeting local voters. However, 
further research will address this counter-intuitive point. The explanation of the 
differences across models may have to do with deep province-level effects that are 
affecting legislators with the same territorial origin together. In fact, taking a look at the 
reports of the random intercepts, they explain a substantive part of the variance of the 
model. As it becomes evident in Table 5.8, variation is the norm in terms of province-
level effects. A very substantive finding is the strong and negative coefficient of the City 
of Buenos Aires. Given that it has no municipal structure yet, the expectation of a 
negative direction was clear, and it is confirmed now. 
Looking at the coefficients for committee chairmanship, hypothesis 5 seems to be 
confirmed. Committee chairmen notoriously decrease the use of local legislation, also 
with a strong statistical significance. Everything else equal, committee chairs that have a 
municipal background reduce the chances of sending local bills by 21% compared to 
those that do not lead a committee. Similarly, deputies without a past as mayors but 
leading a committee are 26% less likely to submit local bills than those colleagues who 
are not a chair. 
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Table 5.8: Random Intercepts by Province 
Province Intercept 
BUENOS AIRES 
CAP FEDERAL 
CATAMARCA 
CHACO 
CHUBUT 
CORDOBA 
CORRIENTES 
ENTRE RIOS 
FORMOSA 
JUJUY 
LA PAMPA 
LA RIOJA 
MENDOZA 
MISIONES 
NEUQUEN 
RIO NEGRO 
S DEL ESTERO 
SALTA 
SAN JUAN 
SAN LUIS 
SANTA CRUZ 
SANTA FE 
TDELFUEGO 
TUCUMAN 
-0.23 
-6.60 
0.82 
0.42 
1.32 
0.67 
0.99 
1.31 
0.64 
1.03 
0.74 
0.74 
-5.47 
-5.19 
0.99 
1.47 
1.42 
0.96 
0.15 
1.48 
1.25 
0.91 
0.93 
0.35 
Gubernatorial Results 
Empirical tests of the gubernatorial hypotheses show that the intuition was 
globally correct, but without a notion of how powerful the effect was going to be. 
Namely, my expectation was not to find any statistical significance in the coefficient of 
previous governors. In the two estimated models, having a previous gubernatorial 
background is strongly negatively correlated with the chances of submitting province-
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level bills. Predicted probabilities confirm the enounced direction. For non-committee 
chairs, the relative decrease in the submission of province-based legislation is 30%, while 
the rate for committee members diminishes to 30%. I let predicted probabilities vary by 
party, but the expected decrease equals thirty percent in every case overall. This finding 
forces a new interpretation of the role of these former provincial executives with a place 
in the House. What is, ultimately, their goal and raison d'etre? What do they really care 
about during their tenure? Are they really political corpses? In order to state this, the 
term limits hypothesis should be checked, as a mean of verifying whether this lack of 
territorial target is general or just restricted to governors that left for other reasons than 
normative barriers. 
As Table 5.9 shows, term limits is not a significant covariate to predict provincial 
bill submission in any of the models. While hypothesis 3 expected that, given their 
possible expectations to go back to the district, term limited deputies should behave 
more district-oriented; it is clear that this variable does not differentiate legislators in 
terms of their congressional activity. This finding casts even more doubts about the 
political vitality of former provincial executives in the House. Is the Chamber definitely 
a political geriatric, in that case? It is not easy to answer such a question categorically, 
given the available information. What seems to be clear is that these officers' behavior is 
far from reflecting what an ambitious politician should do. Another explanation might 
be beyond the current analysis: former governors with political aspirations need other 
kinds of resources that cannot be achieved in the Chamber of Deputies. 
On the contrary, other covariates like Committee Chairmanship and the 
absolute distance to the majority party median legislator (in the clustered SE model) are 
negatively related to the submission of targeted legislation, as in the case of former 
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mayors. Thus, it seems that committee chairmen either do not need to act defensively, or 
they can use approved legislation as a capital to show. 
Table 5.9: Gubernatorial Models 
Previous Governor 
Committee Chair 
Distance to Median 
Distance to Majority Median 
PJ member 
Provincial Party Member 
District Magnitude 
Term Limited 
Constant 
Observations 
Random Intercept 
Pseudo-R2 
Clustered SE 
-0.30*** 
(-0.10) 
-0.41*** 
(-0.06) 
-0.22*** 
(-0.08) 
-0.04 
(-0.10) 
0.14** 
(0.06) 
0.20** 
(-0.10) 
-0.03*** 
(-0.01) 
0.24 
(0.17) 
-0.89*** 
(-0.07) 
101,533 
.03 
Random Intercept 
-0.28 *** 
(0.06) 
-0.31 *** 
-0.02 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.20 *** 
-0.03 
0.05 * 
-0.02 
0.09* 
-0.040 
0.02 *** 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
-1.07 
(0.11) 
101,534 
0.27 
(0.52) 
0.07 
Discussion 
In this chapter, I analyzed the relationship between previous background and 
legislative performance. I think that the main general finding is a fact that might become 
fundamental for future lines of research on subnational politics in Argentina: how 
different the strategies of former mayors and former governors in the House are. While 
previous mayors keep on feeding symbolically the voters of the municipalities of their 
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home provinces; no defensive activity can be seen by former governors. On the contrary, 
the statistical analysis suggests that, the likelihood of sending province-level bills 
decreases in their cases. Such a negative finding makes a reevaluation of the intuitions 
necessary. Does it mean that these previous winners of extremely relevant positions do 
not care about future perspectives anymore? Have they reached, in fact, the upper 
bounds of political ambition in Argentina, and nothing else deserves efforts? This would 
be true if the results of term limited former governors were different. Then, it would be 
easy to state that politicians who left their seats for non-normative reasons are just 
anticipating retirement. However, people that left office due to term limits are not 
necessarily political corpses. What would explain that they tend to write even less 
targeted pieces than any other single legislator? A feasible answer can be found in the 
literature of political communication (Popkin 1990, Zaller 1992). Specifically, former 
governors are so well known by voters that they do not need additional cues to remain 
at the top of provincial citizens' minds. If they expect a return to the head of the district, 
the governorship, they need money for campaigning and material goods to deliver, but 
not necessarily symbolic politics to their voters. If the expected revenue of bill drafting is 
low, in spite of its low cost, representatives might not even spend their time at doing 
this. 
How and why should the expectation of former mayors differ? As stated, 
multiple goals could be forged from congressional office after serving as a municipal 
head. One of the options is to return to the district, and it does not necessarily imply a 
step back in a political career. Aside, such a politician could choose to jump to the 
provincial level, which implies a whole different challenge in terms of knowledge, 
advertisement, diffusion of ideas and creation of a support base. In order to do so, an 
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untouched reputation among former constituents can mean a lot to potential intra-party 
challengers, for future voters of other municipalities and also for leaders thinking whom 
they should support. With those perspectives in mind, it does seem rational that former 
mayors invest their time in targeted bill drafting. They can use the revenues of those 
activities for many further goals. Why should governors not emulate them? A reason 
might be that they would just consider going back to the governorship; a movement that 
is not only hard to pursue, but also poorly affected by symbolic politics. 
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Chapter 6: How Further Career Ambitions affect Legislative 
Performance 
The Future begins Today 
In the previous chapter, I analyzed the effects of subnational executive career 
backgrounds over legislative behavior. As theoretically expected, former mayors tend to 
act defensively, submitting additional amounts of legislation that target past municipal 
constituents. The causal mechanism posits that legislators tend to anticipate their future 
perspectives by keeping their home district's voters symbolically fed. For that analysis, 
present behavior is a function of the past. However, the past is undoubtedly related with 
immediate future. Non-ambitious politicians would hardly create systematic biases 
towards any territorial group, unless their goals exceeded political careers37. Whenever 
politicians have further expectations, and those involve some kind of territorial 
component, why shouldn't they try to use legislation on their favor? 
Putting an eye over prospective constituents seems an almost logical step before 
entering an electoral race. If, as pointed out in Chapter 3, introducing legislation is not 
costly in Argentina and it can be useful for that goal; legislators might try to take 
advantage of one of the best available resources during their congressional tenure. Thus, 
legislators with further subnational ambition should bias legislation towards their future 
voters. The causal mechanism is slightly different from the one explained in chapter 5. 
Specifically, legislators are not trying to keep their past electoral support; rather, they are 
trying to create it. This does not imply the assumption that every legislator is in a tabula 
37
 Remington (2008) highlights that Russian deputies have discrete ambition, and all they want to do is to 
be rewarded by the interest groups they tend to benefit with legislation. Even in such an environment, 
assuming that IIGGs are not territorially concentrated, there should not be any need of care about local 
preferences. 
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rasa position at the beginning of the congressional mandate. Of course, politicians have 
dissimilar backgrounds in many dimensions (former experience in office, tenure in 
politics, previous runs). Nonetheless, ambitious politicians with and without a previous 
background might try to anticipate their immediate goals. Progressive ambition implies 
expectations about performance in further (especially immediate) stages of political 
careers. Considering that, as stated, bill drafting is one of the few visible resources in the 
hands of representatives; we should expect a prospective behavior by those who seek a 
subnational executive position. 
Challenger candidates for subnational executive positions face a plethora of 
defies in terms of knowledge, diffusion, publicity of ideas and proposals, grassroots 
activities, finances, and recruitment of adherents to monitor the fairness of the elections. 
In parallel, incumbents for subnational executives have, in general, several advantages, 
similar to what is stated in the aforementioned literature in American politics for 
Congress, and also in studies of city councils (Krebs 1998, 1999, 2005, Krebs and 
Pelissero 2001). Even though no single piece has analyzed what makes Argentine 
subnational executives advantaged in their races38, there are several intuitions associated 
with the benefits of holding office. First, as repeatedly mentioned in previous chapters, 
knowledge of the current executive is consistently higher. Second, subjects in office can 
count with staff, contracts, money and other kinds of selective incentives. Those can be 
extremely useful for adding allies, doing territorial work, organizing the Election Day 
logistic, and, why not, even buying votes39. Third, incumbents with a well established 
political capital in the district can vertically bargain with candidates for other positions 
38
 This is a very preliminary parallel project I started working on. 
39 See Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes (2004) and Calvo and Murillo (2005) for a deep discussion on the 
topic 
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(i.e. president, deputy, or governor for the mayoral case) and attach their ballots to those 
of popular candidates. Such a strategy could be beneficial for both parties, as the recent 
experience shows40. 
Considering the aforementioned favorable scenarios for incumbents, legislators 
with subnational executive ambitions should think very well about the structure of 
opportunities (Schlesinger 1968) before entering a race. At this stage, no one will doubt 
that becoming a governor or the mayor of a relevant city is a better spot than being a 
backbencher in Congress. However, when risks are high, seeking any other office might 
be Nash equilibrium for a politician at time h. Since some of these risks are associated 
with relative disadvantage vis-a-vis incumbents; deterrence from entering into the race 
should increase as the perceived incumbency advantage also rises. 
Incumbency, Deterrence and Career Perspectives 
How does incumbency perform at the subnational level? Unlike just minor 
exceptions (De Luca 2008), the literature has overlooked the dynamics of subnational 
executive careerism in Argentina. In a system where, as stated, ambition is multilevel, it 
is almost mandatory to know how the structure of opportunities is shaped. Thus, a key 
component of the explanation is to know the extent to which static ambition is a valid 
assumption for governors and mayors. 
40
 The process of territorialization of politics (Gibson 2004, Calvo and Escolar 2005) made subnational 
actors even more powerful. Most presidential candidates sought the support of already established 
governors and mayors, in order to count with the votes that this reverse coattails effect might track to them. 
As a counterpart, the alignment with a presidential candidate might imply that other runner ups for the 
provincial or municipal position be removed by the higher office candidate; or that they decided to 
withdraw from the race, after losing the expected support by the presidential contender. 
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Governors 
Argentine governors are directly elected every four years. Polls mostly use 
plurality rule and there is a huge variation in the presence and the length of term limits. 
These differences are endogenously shaped by ambition; in fact, many territorial leaders 
have altered the rules of the game in their favor during their first periods, in order to 
remove pitfalls for staying in office (Calvo and Micozzi 2005). Overall, a tendency 
towards strengthening the power of the incumbent governor and/or coalition of power 
has been the rule in Argentina. 
Between 1983 and 2007,163 regular elections have taken place for the choice of 
governors and, in most districts, also vice-governors41. Since there have been some 
discontinuities, special elections and federal interventions, the total number of 
gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial positions equals 345 in the period. 242 politicians 
occupied these positions, most politicians were elected, but some positions were filled 
by provincial legislators in the line of succession. In the original sample, 189 spots 
belonged to a governor, and they were occupied by 133 subjects. Given that governors in 
the first period (1983 for most provinces) did not have the chance of reelection before 
arriving to the seat, the number of possible incumbents drops to 165. 
How have these governors behaved in career terms after their mandates? As it 
becomes evident in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, a huge number of governors (three quarters) have 
not been immediately reelected overall. The highest contribution to this group is 
provided by those unable to pursue reelection due to term limits (86 over 122, a 70%). 
Some provincial constitutions did not include the figure of the vice-governor. All of those provinces 
reformed their rules and created this position no later than 1991. 
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Within the set of governors that did have the chance of seeking immediate reelection, 
more than a half (54%) got it. 
Table 6.1: Proportion of Governors seeking Reelection by Ability for 
seeking Reelection 
Have been reelected 
Can be reelected 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
Total 
No 
86 
1 
36 
0.46 
122 
0.74 
Yes 
0 
0 
43 
0.54 
43 
0.26 
Total 
86 
1 
79 
1 
165 
1 
Table 6.2: Proportion of Governors that can be reelected by those 
effectively seeking Reelection 
Have been reelected 
Can be reelected 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
Total 
No 
86 
0.71 
36 
0.29 
122 
1 
Yes 
0 
0 
43 
1 
43 
1 
Total 
86 
0.53 
79 
0.47 
165 
1 
As Table 6.3 shows, just five of the 36 governors who were eligible to run for 
reelection, voluntarily withdrew from the competition. Three of them retired from 
politics all together (Felipe Sapag, at age 82, in 1999, Arnoldo Castillo, at 77, in 1999, and 
Carlos Verna in 2007), and two moved to the Senate, one in order to improve his party's 
performance (Oscar Castillo in 2003) and the other because he was deterred from 
running in the primary against former governor Angel Rozas (Roy Nikisch in 2007). 
Within the remaining 31 politicians, eight were defeated in open elections, three sought 
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presidential office, one lost the party primary (Jorge Sobisch in 1995), and the other 19 
were not in favorable positions. Basically, nine of them left office early (impeachment, 
resignation, or federal intervention) and the ten remaining governors were vice-
governors or legislators that took office temporarily. Thus, their chances of revalidating 
their mandates were almost null (for the former) or extremely limited (for the latter). In 
stun, at least from the static distribution, I can infer that governors in office did not seek 
reelection whenever they could not (could not legally seek office or were not politically 
viable). Otherwise, incumbents tend to seek reelection. 
Table 6.3: Reasons for Not Running for a Straight Gubernatorial Period, 
Term Limits Absent 
Not Reelected N , ^ „
 v 
Can but don't run 
Higher office 
Defeated in Elections 
Defeated in a Primary 
Early exit 
Interim 
Total 
5 
3. 
8 
1 
9 
10 
36 
0.14 
0.08 
0.22 
0.03 
0.25 
0.28 
1.00 
If, as stated, governors tend to stay in office unless legal barriers and structures 
of opportunity make it unlikely; legislators' chances of jumping to that spot decrease in a 
similar fashion. Over the basis of only 48 existing elected positions in the provincial 
executive branch, real chances for legislators to become governors are relatively low. 
However, the presence of executive term limits for all but two provinces (San Luis and 
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Catamarca) fosters prospective calculations. There is a relative certainty42 about when a 
spot is likely to become open. Thus, strategic behavior is likely to be observed in those 
circumstances. 
How often have representatives sought gubernatorial positions? Table 6.4 shows 
that almost 12% of representatives attempted to jump to the provincial executive. In 
contrast with the scarce 4% of former governors holding a position in the House, 179 
representatives tried to reach the highest provincial position. Their rate of success is 
analyzed separately in Chapter 7. 
Table 6.4: Percentage of Representatives Immediately Seeking a 
Gubernatorial Position 
Gubernatorial Candidate N Percent 
No 
Yes 
Total 
1,322 
179 
1,501 
88.07 
11.93 
100 
Mayors 
At the mayoral level, things are more complicated for several reasons. First, even 
though I created the most comprehensive dataset of mayors and mayoral candidates, 
information is not balanced. Namely, the number of municipalities varies across time 
depending on data availability. Second, new municipalities were created over time, 
thereby altering the sample, too. Third, in more theoretical terms, variation in the 
municipal structure and in the institutional and behavioral features of each province 
Several governors have changed the constitutions, called to plebiscites or forced provincial Courts to 
reinterpret term limits in order to stay in power, even though the prohibition was explicit. 
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makes the static assumption more complicated to be held at the mayoral level. Thus, the 
proxies for understanding patterns of ambition are less precise. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to observe some tendencies. Taken all the periods and districts together, and 
based on the available data (11,789 observations for 2,238 municipalities between 1983 
and 2007)43, I can compare the rate of effective incumbency across years. I am not 
considering candidacy here, but only whether the mayors have remained the same 
across time. 
Using these data, sixty percent of mayors have not served more than one term, as 
showed in Table 6.5. While a quarter of the sample served two terms, just 14% stayed 
three periods or more. Such a distribution would suggest that ambition might not be as 
static as for the case of governors. However, as mentioned, missing observations abound 
for periods before 1991. Thus, the likelihood that longer careers are underrepresented is 
substantive, especially for smaller municipalities. 
Table 6.5: Tenure of Mayors 
Tenure Percent 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Total 
4,294 
1,763 
756 
251 
93 
22 
4 
7,183 
59.78 
24.54 
10.52 
3.49 
1.29 
0.31 
0.06 
100 
43
 A naive calculation would consist in multiplying the N of municipalities (2238) by the seven time 
periods. If this was the theoretical sample, my sample would equal a 75.25% of the real data. However, as 
mentioned, districts have been created and mergedacross time. Thus, I think my data share is actually 
bigger than .75. 
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Looking at the shares of straight reelection of mayors, the net numbers show 
about a 40% rate, as Table 6.6 shows. In order to avoid the mentioned different-N bias, I 
checked the rates over different samples, calculating them for districts with information 
in more than three, four or five periods in the database. In all of the cases, variation did 
not exceed 2%. So, overall, effective reelection rates at the municipal level are about 40%. 
Considering that information about candidacies is still imprecise, but assuming that no 
single incumbent will automatically win; it can be thought that the rate of pursuit of 
reelection is higher than that 40%. In order to verify whether there is any first-sight 
variation in the reelection rates by municipality, a common intuition is to try to 
distinguish districts over the basis of their relevance. Many proxies could be useful to 
make that differentiation. Population is one of those. However, given the variations in 
inhabitants across provinces, and also the dissimilar municipal structures, population 
might over represent the effects of districts of bigger provinces. As alternatives, 
economic indicators such as budgets, public employment or financial autonomy vis-a-
vis the province might be good measures of relevance, but they are not available. Thus, 
the best indicator I came up with is the percentage of provincial population living in a 
given municipality. I am aware that this proxy might be imprecise (municipalities of 
provinces with 10 units are likely to concentrate a higher share than those of provinces 
with 400 units), but it has been the most reliable measure I could find so far. As a proxy, 
I created a measure that could be called the effective number of municipalities (enm). The 
mathematical formula is the same as that used by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and 
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adjusts the number of municipal units by the relative weight of each one44. As it can be 
read in the second column of Table 6.7, the effective number of municipalities ranges 
between 2 and 35. Does it mean that provinces that are high in the rank provide more 
opportunity structures? This could be arithmetically true, but it is not a mechanic 
statement. Districts with multiple relevant municipalities may have strong and stable 
leaderships that prevent any seat to be open across time45. The third column in Table 6.7 
shows that there is no clear relationship between the number of relevant municipalities 
and reelection rate. Moreover, the correlation coefficient among both is .42, so no 
simplistic association can be performed. In sum, opportunity structures seem to be 
highly contingent on political context, more than logically derived from the number of 
districts and the distribution of population across provinces. Nonetheless, district-level 
characteristics might play any role in the patterns of mayoral reelection. 
Table 6.6: Rate of Reelection of Mayors -1983-2007 
Reelected - ^^/N.-^^.^^-.-.Percent:;;; 
No 
Yes 
Total 
6,348 
4,058 
10,406 
61.00 
39.00 
100.00 
44 l 
The formula is —: , where p; is the population share of each municipality of each province. 
n 
45
 In fact, the Province of Buenos Aires, the province with the largest enm, has long-lasting leaderships in 
most of its main municipalities. 
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Table 6.7: Effective Number of Municipalities by Province, and Mayoral 
Reelection Rates -1983-2007 
Province 
Buenos Aires 
Cordoba 
Misiones 
Entre Rios 
Rio Negro 
Mendoza 
Chaco 
San Juan 
Santa Fe 
La Pampa 
Corrientes 
Jujuy 
Tucuman 
Catamarca 
Salta 
Chubut 
Santiago del Estero 
Neuquen 
Santa Cruz 
Formosa 
La Rioja 
San Luis 
Tierra del Fuego 
• ., E N M . , 
35.58 
22.98 
11.80 
11.23 
11.18 
10.75 
10.12 
8.70 
8.26 
7.81 
6.94 
6.13 
5.60 
5.12 
5.08 
4.87 
4.43 
4.30 
4.20 
3.80 
3.71 
3.51 
2.02 
Reelection 
0.46 
0.51 
0.48 
0.22 
0.28 
0.43 
0.42 
0.24 
0.47 
0.38 
0.36 
0.21 
0.16 
0.28 
0.40 
0.39 
0.29 
0.27 
0.29 
0.27 
0.48 
0.35 
0.35 
In order to improve our knowledge about reelection rates, I distinguished 
municipalities in two groups over the basis of the median share of population, the upper 
75% and finally the upper 90%. Rates of reelection tend to decrease as the percentile of 
population in municipalities increases. As it can be read in Table 6.8, the higher the 
threshold, the lower is the reelection rate in these groups. When the sample is divided 
50-50, 36% of the mayors of the most populated half of municipalities was reelected. 
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When the upper 25% is taken, reelection rate drops to 34%, which diminishes to 30% if 
just the upper 10% is considered. This information does not mean anything by itself, but 
might give a broad intuition: the higher the population and the expected relevance of a 
municipality, the higher the levels of visibility, competitiveness and actors involved. 
This might also depress the rates of reelection and increase the incentives for legislators 
seeking that position. 
So, how likely is it that legislators pursue mayoral positions? Table 6.9 shows 
that 6% of representatives in office have immediately sought a municipal executive spot. 
Intuitively, if availability of resources is a predictor of career success, politicians' interest 
in subnational positions should increase as the municipality becomes wealthier, more 
populated and has a bigger budget. However, people do not always choose where to 
live or where to start their careers. Thus, a pure rational choice self-selection argument 
for municipal positions is definitely not accurate. Politicians tend to seek a mayoral 
position in their home municipalities whenever the political opportunities are favorable. 
However, subjects having reached a national executive position would hardly expect to 
become mayors if their districts meant a political jail for them. So, it can be thought that 
these district-characteristics should also be a part of the opportunity structures for 
political careers. Analyzing the data, the population average of those districts that 
legislators have run for is .12. Clearly, the mean is much higher than the average of the 
full sample (.01). Thus, having seen that reelection rates diminish as districts become 
more relevant, and having realized that legislators in office tend to run mostly for 
relevant districts; an empirical realization of legislators' behavior whenever they pursue 
a mayor position becomes full of sense. 
82 
Table 6.8: Rate of Reelection of Mayors in the 50%, 75% and 90% 
Intervals -1983-2007 
>S®£-r*£&.v--. 
' $ ' ' • ' • 
* : v ^ - . -
• • '.-'"•• "?!'• 
.;, Upper 50%. ,v 
3332 
63.92 
1881 
36.08 
5213 
100 
, Upper 75%,;,. 
1825 
65.69 
953 
34.31 
2778 
100 
Upper 90% 
726 
69.47 
319 
30.53 
1045 
100 
Table 6.9: Percentage of Legislators Immediately running for Mayoral 
Positions -1983-2007 
Mayoral Candidate Percent 
0 
1 
Total 
1,408 
93 
1,501 
93.8 
6.2 
100 
Hypotheses 
The goal of the present piece exceeds the (undoubtedly) interesting question 
about when would a legislator seek subnational positions. It is clear that the likelihood 
increases when the opportunities are perceived as favorable. However, I am interested 
in unfolding legislators' behavior when they decide to run for a subnational position. To 
do so, I will try to disentangle whether bill drafting foresees immediate subnational 
executive ambition. 
Through the utilization of the database already described, I will use the 
immediate pursuit of a gubernatorial or a mayoral position as dependent variables of 
my estimations. The principal covariate will be whether each legislator is running for a 
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gubernatorial or mayoral position at the end of her current legislative mandate (one 
model per category). I will keep most of the controls of the previous models: pertinence 
to the majority party, pertinence to the governor's party in her province, absolute 
distance from the median ideal point in the floor, absolute distance from the median 
ideal point in the floor, member of the Peronist party and member of a Provincial party. 
Two main hypotheses are stated: 
6.1: Legislators seeking a gubernatorial position immediately after their congressional 
mandate tend to submit more province-level legislation than their colleagues who do 
not 
6.2: Legislators expecting an immediate mayoral position tend to submit more 
legislation targeting the municipalities of their provinces than their complements. 
As in Chapter 5, alternative hypotheses are derived from some of the principal control 
covariates: 
6.3: The farther away a legislator is from the majority party median ideal point, the 
higher the chances of submitting locally-based legislation 
6.4: Committee chairs are less likely to submit locally-based legislation 
I run two models for each hypothesis, as I did in Chapter 5. First, I employ a 
multi-level approach that captures random intercepts at the provincial level. Then, I 
employ a Bernoulli-logistic model with clustered standard errors at each legislator's 
level. Doing so, I expect to assess the individual-level effects that, I think, are affecting 
legislative behavior. 
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Results 
As Table 6.10 shows, the empirical analysis provides strongsupport for my first 
hypothesis. The coefficient of the covariate of mayoral candidate is positive and very 
significant in both models. Once computed the expected increase in the likelihood of 
submitting local legislation, results become even more conclusive. Whenever a deputy 
was immediately seeking a mayoral position, the chances of local bill drafting increase 
between 39% and 42%, controlled at different values of the other relevant covariates. As 
in the previous chapter, variation in partisanship does not push predicted probabilities 
too far from each other. As well as the defensive hypothesis was supported in the 
previous chapter, it seems that municipal ambition also triggers strategic behavior 
towards constituents in the current models. 
Findings concerning hypothesis 6.3 work against the predicted direction just in < 
the clustered SE model, with a negative sign and statistical significance. Once again, as 
in the case of previous background, the evidence suggests that the enounced direction is 
not empirically verifiable. That negative finding deserves a separate analysis that links 
ideological position and legislative activity, which is not included in the goals of the 
current piece. 
It is also noteworthy that chances of Committee chairs submitting local 
legislation are, on average, 28% less than for every single other legislator. Thus, the 
fourth hypothesis is empirically support for prospective municipal heads, as it was the 
case of former mayors. The previous analysis alike, a feasible explanation is given by the 
greater ability to get legislation passed that makes inflation of bills not as necessary. 
Another result that deserves attention is the importance of the provincial dimension in 
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the multilevel estimation. Further research will try to unfold these subnational 
mechanisms that explain so much variation in this model. 
Table 6.10: Results of the Mayoral Models 
Mayoral Candidate 
Committee Chair 
Distance to Median 
Distance to Majority Median 
PJ member 
Provincial Party Member 
District Magnitude 
Constant 
Observations 
Random Intercept 
Pseudo-R2 
Clustered SE 
0.36*** 
(0.13) 
-0.35*** 
(0.09) 
-0.43*** 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.13) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.22 
(0.14) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-2.11*** 
(0.09) 
101,533 
0.01 
Random Intercept 
0.30 *** 
(0.05) 
-0.32 *** 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.32 *** 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
0.03 *** 
(0.00) 
-2.82 *** 
(0.49) 
101,533 
5.636 
(2.374) 
0.04 
At the gubernatorial side, things also perform as expected. None of the models 
shows statistical significance for the main covariate of interest. Thus, gubernatorial 
expectations do not have any impact over expected behavior towards legislators' 
districts. The only covariate that is robust across estimations, and also consistent with its 
performance in the municipal model, is Committee chairmanship: the sign is always 
negative and statistically significant. In more theoretical terms, we would say that 
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ambitious legislators seeking a gubernatorial position may not perceive that territorial 
work and bases of reputation can be improved through the vise of legislation; or that 
using bill drafting does not deserve efforts and dedication compared to the expected 
revenue in such a province-wide races. 
Table 6.11: Results of Gubernatorial Models 
Gubernatorial Candidate 
Committee Chair 
Distance to Median 
Distance to Majority Median 
PJ member 
Provincial Party Member 
District Magnitude 
Constant 
Observations 
Random Intercept 
Pseudo-R2 
Clustered SE 
0.11 
(0.08) 
-0.41*** 
(0.06) 
-0.23*** 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
0.14** 
(0.05) 
0.19* 
(0.10) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
-0.92*** 
(0.06) 
101,533 
0.02 
Random Intercept 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.32 *** 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.21 *** 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.09 * 
(0.04) 
0.02 *** 
(0.00) 
-1.08 *** 
(0.01) 
101533 
0.47 
(0.22) 
.04 
Discussion 
At this stage, general support for the statement that politicians act strategically 
during their congressional tenure can be assessed. However, this inference cannot be 
made for every single legislator. Clearly, individuals with immediate municipal 
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ambition are more likely to use legislation as a political device, in order to further their 
goals. At the side of gubernatorial candidates, the use of legislation seems not to be a 
resource that deserves a strategic use. The apparent paradox is that, while a 20% of the 
117,000 analyzed bills have the province of its sponsor as a target; just a 9% of these 
drafts refer the municipalities of the proposer's home province. Part of the explanation 
of this apparent contradiction might lie in the mentioned expectation of the default 
behavior. While targeting the home municipality has sense for most politicians; their 
careers would depend on these constituents' decisions just in the case they expected a 
municipal-level position. Whenever legislators try to defend their municipal reputation 
or increase it for further executive races, they tend to use bills strategically. On the 
contrary, politicians that do expect a province-level or even a national elected position 
(even legislative reelection!) need to show some capital in the home province. Hence, 
regardless of gubernatorial ambition, legislators tend to inflate the submission of 
provincial bills. 
Thus, should I infer a selective use of legislative resources, depending on 
patterns of ambition? This seems a reasonable statement. If I had information similar to 
that gathered by Crisp and Desposato (2005) about the yearly miles flown by each 
candidate, I might discover that legislators that expect a gubernatorial candidacy travel 
more than prospective mayors. As the scope and complexity of the office change, 
strategic behavior is likely to do so as well. 
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Chapter 7: How Bill Drafting affects Success 
Making Bills Count 
Bill drafting is one of the easiest ways to contribute to the creation of a political 
capital in Argentina. Legislators (especially prospective mayoral candidates) use projects 
as devices to generate ties with voters and signal to party leaders that they are relevant 
actors. Following a rational choice perspective, an implication of this is that bill drafting 
should contribute to legislators' electoral success. If legislators pursuing a subnational 
position have strategically proposed legislation period after period, should success not 
be a frequent output? Otherwise, why would congressmen do it? 
Despite that this logic sounds compelling, there are some counterintuitive issues 
at the stage of unfolding the causal mechanism. It is true that bill submission needs to 
involve some expected utility. However, it is not easy to assess what the impact of that 
activity is. If such a question becomes a whole empirical and methodological challenge 
for a social scientist; it is less clear how a single politician with other priorities would 
recognize and evaluate that influence. Legislators will hardly take time to observe how 
many local bills their colleagues have sent in the past and how those bills have affected 
their success in the electoral race. Such a calculation might be the norm in an 
environment where bill drafting implies large investments; yet, as mentioned, writing 
bills does not involve substantial costs. Thus, mere expectations (rather than evidence of 
concrete revenues) about the impact of bills should be persuasive enough for legislators' 
to strategically introduce legislation. Nonetheless, behavior is not fully dissociated from 
expectations of success. If mere inflation of locally-targeted pieces mechanically 
provided high revenues, almost every single legislator should be tempted to author 
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enormous amounts of locally-targeted legislation. As mentioned earlier, forceful 
subnational linkages in Argentine politics make it unlikely that the baseline be zero. In 
fact, as it can be seen in Table 7.1, about 90% of every single legislator in office has ever 
sent at least a bill regarding her home province; and circa 70% has done the same 
concerning the municipalities of the province. However, it is not true that every single 
legislator submits hundreds of local bills period after period. As shown in Table 7.2, on 
average, every representative submits 34 bills per congressional period (two years), 
which means 68 pieces for each 4-years mandate. Among those, fourteen bills (about 
20%) involve a reference to the province, and six bills (circa 10%) target the 
municipalities of the province. Thus, territorial work is far (very far) from being the 
main duty of legislative activity. 
Table 7.1: Percentage of Legislators that have Submitted Bills with 
Provincial and Municipal Content 
• . . • ' . ' ' . 
Yes 
No 
Total 
Home Province 
Bills 
1,337 
164 
1,501 
1 •%. 
89.07 
10.93 
100 
Home Province's 
. Municipalities Bills 
4
 \ • N :,;.-
1,038 
463 
1,501 
' • • ' % • 
69.15 
30.85 
100 
Table 7.2: Average of Bills Submitted by Congressional Period - Full 
Sample, Provincially-Targeted and Municipality-Targeted 
Sample Units Mean Std. Dev. 
Total Bills 
Home Province 
Home Province's 
Municipalities 
3,453 
3,453 
3,453 
33.96 
6.99 
3.06 
45.7 
10.91 
5.56 
1 
0 
0 
586 
153 
64 
90 
Does this mean that bill-drafting is random and, as an implication, that this 
project is innocuous? I do not think that. As I have empirically assessed, politicians with 
immediate territorial expectations, especially at the mayoral level, strategically author 
extensive amounts of local legislation. However, the question of the impact is salient 
here again. Is there a positive relationship between local bill submission and electoral 
success? An affirmative answer would be the last link of the causal chain of this project. 
However, the task does not seem easy. 
Multiple factors can affect electoral chances at multiple levels. The literature 
recognizes several predictors of success in executive elections, such as the performance 
of the economy (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 1978; Weatherford 1978; Fiorina 1978, 1981; 
Wildes 1976), popularity of the current president (Peltzman, 1987; Piereson, 1975; Simon, 
Ostrom, & Marra, 1991), campaigns (Petrocik 1996) and incumbent president's approval 
rating (Brody and Sigelman 1983). At the subnational level, different factors have been 
associated with executive electoral success, such as national economy (Gelineau and 
Remmer 2006), state economic perceptions (Stein 1990, Squire and Fastnow, 1994, 
Honwell and Vanderleeus 1990, Atkeson and Partin 1995, Niemi, Stanley and Vogel 
1995), state tax increases (Jewell and Olson 1988) and degrees of isolation from national 
environments and economic performance (Chubb 1988), among others. As it can be seen, 
most of these factors are exogenous to individual candidates' actions. It is necessary to 
browse the literature of minority representation to see how individual-level factors such 
as race (Fraga 1988, Hero 1992, Pantoja, Nicholson and Segura 2006, Barreto 2007) or 
gender (Herrnson, Lay and Stokes 2003, Brians 2005, Palmer and Simon 2005) affect 
candidate's success. However, these personal attributes are constant across time and, 
therefore, not prone for strategic manipulation. Thus, it becomes also a theoretical 
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challenge to try to link individual legislative behavior with further success in 
subnational races. 
Given that context, it is not easy to assess the extent to which success in 
subnational races is due to targeted performance in the legislature, combined with the 
aforementioned possible factors. However, there is no reason not to try to empirically 
assess this relationship. In this chapter, I evaluate whether different indicators of 
submission of targeted bills makes, at least, a positive difference in the likelihood of 
success in a subnational race. 
Unfolding the Effect 
In order to be fully consistent with the literature, I should specify a model that 
takes the macro-level variables into account at the moment of making an electoral 
prediction. It is hard to cast doubts about the influence of the national level factors over 
subnational electoral results. In fact, the (scarce) literature about the Argentine case 
posits substantive effects of national economic conditions over support for candidates 
(Remmer and Gelineau 2003, Canton and Jorrat 2002, Seligson 2003, Gervasoni 1997, 
1998, Gelineau 2002, Echegaray 2005, Singer and Rosas 2007). However, recent pieces 
have demonstrated how lower-level effects also make a difference for subnational 
actors' performance. Gelineau and Remmer (2006) find that subnational economic 
performance is a good predictor of subnational electoral success, along with the national 
economy. Similarly, Porto and Porto (2000) show that fiscal performance at the 
municipal level affected mayoral elections in the Province of Buenos Aires. 
Nevertheless, my interest is to understand whether congressional activity, and 
especially bill drafting, makes a difference in electoral performance. Even if I wanted to 
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create a model including all the macro-factors specified above, I would hardly be able to 
do the analysis for the whole sequence. The argument is practical: data about economic 
performance may be available for the whole 1983-2007 sequence, but no comparable 
series with indicators of presidential popularity, perceptions about performance of the 
economy, state-level government or candidate evaluation, and even partisanship or 
ideological positions exist. Thus, I would have to either limit my analysis to an 
extremely short time period, or drop most of my observations due to missing values. 
That situation given, I prefer to take a different risk and evaluate how Congress-related 
covariates affect the chances of success in subnational executive races. Many observers 
might immediately point out that an omitted variable bias might be tainting results; 
nonetheless, nothing prevents the experiment of appraising whether even a small part of 
the variance can be explained by candidate-level strategic behavior. Ultimately, this 
project's goal is not to capture how the whole world performs, but simply to understand 
the relationship between political careers and legislative production in multilevel 
systems. 
Empirical Strategy 
Empirical analyses of the effects of legislative submission over subnational 
success require some adjustments in the data. Given that success can only be evaluated 
over individuals that did run for an executive position, it is nonsense to include subjects 
without immediate subnational expectation in the sample. Thus, I decided to drop those 
observations. As a consequence, I created two separate samples, one of 198 
gubernatorial candidates and another of 97 mayoral contenders. Since the goal is to 
evaluate how bill submission affects executive success, I decided to work with 
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information at the legislator-period level. In other words, each observation of the new 
samples is a legislator that ran for a gubernatorial or mayoral position at t+1. If she won 
the election, the variable success equals " 1 " , zero otherwise. It must be remembered that 
the data used in chapters 5 and 6 were at the bill level, where individual legislators were 
the units of analysis. There, information was used at the maximum level of 
disaggregation. In this case, my equation tries to capture the accumulated activity of a 
Deputy during her congressional tenure immediately before running for a subnational 
spot. This makes it inaccurate to continue working with information at the bill level. As 
a consequence, I also collapsed the covariates of the right-hand side of the equation at 
the legislator-period level. Such a decision may have consequences on the structure of 
the variables, and might also affect the results. In order to avoid any kind of artificial 
effect due to measurement error, I prefer to estimate the models with different 
indicators. This is particularly salient for my principal covariate of the estimation, the 
legislative submission variable. 
I chose to work with two different measures of targeted legislative activity. The 
first is the number of bills with territorial content submitted during the legislative period 
prior to the executive candidacy. This variable will always be positive and ranges 
between zero to 48 for municipal bills, and 0 to 156 for provincial legislation. The 
distribution is shown below in Figure 7.1, and it reflects a high degree of variation across 
individuals. A valid reason to explain these differences is linked with ambition, as will 
be further tested. However, other idiosyncratic factors (individual skills, professional 
background, or more money to hire additional staff members) could affect the global 
amount of local bills submitted. As an attempt to overcome these differences, I use the 
ratio of bills with a territorial content over the whole sample of bills submitted by a 
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legislator in time t as a second indicator. This variable ranges between zero and one and 
normalizes the differences among individuals that de facto have a dissimilar 
predisposition for bill drafting. 
t 8 S . 
Figure 7.1: Distribution of Provincial and Municipal Bills 
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I also decided to use another of the main covariates of previous models: 
executive background. If, as stated, previous executive experience makes a difference in 
legislative activity, it might also affect electoral performance in the near future. 
Rephrasing the argument, a mayor that jumped to the House and expects to return for 
his old position may have attributes (knowledge of constituents' preferences, well 
established image) that make her likelihood of wining the spot different. Thus, I include 
this covariate in the right hand side of the equation. However, descriptive statistics show 
a very salient finding: only three former mayors and two former governors were able to 
return to their old spots after serving in a legislative mandate. Table 7.3 and 7.4 
demonstrate how clear the distributions are. Thus, the expected effect of these covariates 
is likely to have a negative impact on the chances of winning, everything else equal. 
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Table 7.3: Percentage of Former Governors that Won a Gubernatorial Race 
after a Congressional Period 
^ ' ^ o ^ k i ; ^ '<>•• ^•^'~r:\:.y 
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139 
78.53 
20 
95.24 
159 
80.3 
•3V !;iav '-V'S 
38 
21.47 
1 
4.76 
39 
19.70 
': Total/. 
177 
100.00 
21. 
100.00 
198 
100 
Table 7.4: Percentage of Former Mayors that Won a Municipal Race after a 
Congressional Period 
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43 
63.24 
26 
89.66 
69 
71.13 
25 
36.76 
3 
10.34 
28 
28.87 
68 
100.00 
29 
100.00 
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Overall, the specification of the models includes most of the covariates used in 
previous chapters. I will analyze the effect of the number of locally and provincially 
targeted bills on the chances of winning an executive race, controlling for previous 
career background, distance to the majority party median position, distance to the floor 
median position, district magnitude, committee chairmanship and membership to the 
Peronist party. Additionally, I include a new pair of covariates that I judge appropriate 
for the current models. One is whether the candidate belongs to the outgoing executive's 
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party in the province. In this case, even though I do not have information about voters' 
perceptions of the former leader, the high rate of party reelection (see Cao 2000) 
increases the probability that the incumbent party's candidate will win. Aside, I include 
the percentage of population that the district of each candidate represents for the 
province. As mentioned in Chapter 5, bigger municipalities have lower reelection rates 
and therefore have increased the structures of opportunity for challengers. Thus, I 
expect this covariate to positively affect the chances of winning in the municipal model. 
In Order to obtain the correct estimates, based on the structure of the data, I opt 
to run a conventional pooled Bernoulli-logistic model. Even though province-level 
effects may play a role in shaping probabilities, not all the units are represented in the 
sample. Thus, a multilevel model or including fixed effects model would affect not only 
the degrees of freedom, but also capture just a part of the variance. Since I do not think 
that time is playing any role here, no temporal controls are included, either. 
Overall, what should the expectations be, regarding previous chapters' findings? 
As mentioned, submission of province-level legislation is not affected by gubernatorial 
ambition; on the contrary, one of the models shows a negative and substantive effect on 
bill submission. Therefore, should a high number (or share) of targeted bills affect the 
chances of victory? Following the same reasoning, the answer should be negative. In as 
much, following the argument, positive effects should be found at the mayoral race 
level. Five theoretical hypotheses have been formulated for the current analysis: 
8.1: Increases in the number (share) of province-based legislation do not affect success in 
a gubernatorial race 
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8.2: Increases in the number (share) of municipality-based legislation positively affects 
success in a mayoral race 
8.3: Legislators that belong to the party of the outgoing governor (mayor) have higher 
chances of winning a subnational executive race 
8.4: The higher the share of provincial inhabitants in a district, the greater the chances of 
municipal victory by a former legislator 
8.5: Previous subnational executive experience negatively affects the chances of winning 
the same spot 
Gubernatorial Results 
According to the results in Table 7.5, none of the covariates measuring bill 
submission are significant here, consistent with theoretical expectations. The standard 
errors largely exceed the coefficients, making it clear that substantive effects are not even 
a remote possibility. In as much, consistent with hypothesis 8.3's expectations, 
pertinence to the party of the outgoing governor has a positive and significant effect on 
the likelihood of electoral victory. While opposing parties' candidates have an average 
predicted probability of 8% of winning the race, everything else equal; incumbent party 
members have 34% of chances. In relative terms, the advantage makes a governing party 
candidate more than 300% more likely to win the gubernatorial spot. 
Finally, also in the same line of that prescribed by the last hypothesis, previous 
gubernatorial experience is strongly correlated with negative chances of winning the 
race. Setting all the continuous variables to the median and simulating different 
scenarios of binary covariates, the average predicted probability of winning a spot for a 
legislator without previous gubernatorial experience is 35% ( ± 17%); when background 
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is included, probabilities descend to 13% (± 12%), which implies 77% less chances to 
reach the executive seat. 
These results do not do anything but confirm the poor existing relationship 
between legislative activity and gubernatorial expectations. It is not only true that those 
legislators pursuing a provincial-level executive position do not act prospectively, but it 
also becomes evident that the Argentine House is not a very promising previous point 
for politicians with gubernatorial aspirations. This can be interpreted as evidence of the 
claim that a seat in Congress does not provide substantive resources to further a political 
career in Argentina. Material resources are scarce; symbolic resources are rarely used. 
Thus, as a conclusion, it should be well known that some other public office would 
surely be a better springboard to jump to a governorship. 
Table 7.5: Gubernatorial Models 
% of Provincial Bills 
N of Provincial Bills 
Previous Governor 
Distance to Median 
Distance to Majority Median 
Committee Chair 
PJ member 
Provincial Party Member 
District Magnitude 
Outgoing Governor's party 
Constant 
Observations 
R2 
Model 1 
0.46 
-1.05 
-1.55* 
(0.85) 
0.02 
(1.35) 
0.49 
(0.98) 
-0.38 
(0.55) 
0.75 
(0.58) 
0.28 
(0.86) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
1.87*** 
(0.55) 
-2.68*** 
(0.82) 
178 
0.20 
Model 2 
0 
(0.02) 
-1.59* 
(0.85) 
0.00 
(1.35) 
0.46 
(0.98) 
-0.40 
(0.55) 
0.70 
(0.57) 
0.23 
(0.86) 
-0.024 
(0.02) 
1.90*** 
(0.54) 
-2.47*** 
(0.68) 
178 
0.24 
Table 7.6: Predicted Probabilities of Winning a Gubernatorial Race - By 
Party 
Probability 
Outgoing Governor's Party 
Other Party 
0.34 
(0.18) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
100 
Municipal Models 
The first point that must be highlighted for this test is that the relatively small 
size of the sample (N=98) is likely to be slightly erratic. This does not imply that results 
will be biased, but it must be highlighted that it is not fair to expect extreme robustness 
from the data. Regarding hypothesis 7.2, results are mixed. While the covariate 
measuring legislative performance as a percentage of local bills is statistically 
insignificant; increases in the net number of bills appear to be harmful for an electoral 
victory. Contrary to the expectations, this barely significant finding casts some doubts 
about the true role of bill submission over municipal performance. Predicted 
probabilities show ridiculous and unrealistic percentages, forecasting an 88% of chances 
of victory for a legislator who submitted zero bills. Given the mentioned relative scarcity 
of data and the .10 significance (beyond the tolerable boundary of many researchers), I 
will not consider this coefficient to be indicator of a substantive effect, but as evidence of 
no effect. Such a finding forces a reevaluation of the scenario depicted in the theoretical 
discussion. Should bill submission really affect general elections' results, or should it just 
be influential at the stage of pursuit of the candidacy? This reasoning will be expanded 
in the discussion section. 
Contrary to the evidence found in the gubernatorial model, hypothesis 8.3 is not 
supported by the municipal estimations. Following these results, party incumbency 
should not affect a legislator's success in her municipal race. Is a higher rate of party 
alternation a valid explanation? Cao's (2000) piece confirms that there is a huge variation 
in party reelection across time and provinces. This dimension is not a part of the 
purposes of this piece, but it is a substantive topic for further research. 
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Table 7.7: Municipal Models 
% of Municipal Bills 
N of Municipal Bills 
Previous Mayor 
Distance to Median 
Distance to Majority Median 
Committee Chair 
PJ member 
Provincial Party Member 
District Magnitude 
Outgoing Mayor's Party 
Population Ratio 
Constant 
Observations 
R2 
Model 1 
-0.08* 
(0.05) 
-3.34*** 
(1.04) 
-1.04 
(1.82) 
-0.18 
(1.43) 
-1.53* 
(0.79) 
-0.29 
(0.94) 
-0.17 
(1.24) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
1.07 
(0.88) 
-4.79* 
(2.52) 
2.37* 
(1.25) 
89 
0.20 
Model 2 
-1.92 
(1.78) 
-3.09*** 
(0.99) 
-1.60 
(1.77) 
0.37 
(1.37) 
-1.48* 
(0.76) 
-0.07 
(0.94) 
-0.04 
(1.22) 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
0.97 
(0.88) 
-4.58* 
(2.43) 
1.99* 
(1.20) 
89 
0.21 
Empirical evidence suggests that the direction stated in hypothesis 8.4 is 
definitely wrong. Contrary to the belief that bigger districts might have better 
opportunities structures and therefore improve legislators' prospective chances; better 
results have been obtained in smaller-scale municipalities. As it becomes visible in 
Figure 7.2, chances of winning range from 35% when districts are almost insignificant to 
11% when municipalities comprise about half of the provincial population. Should this 
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verification be interpreted, again, as evidence that resources in hands of legislators do 
not let them aspire to relevant spots? Or should we think more on the concomitant 
increase in the competition for big municipalities' races, which demand more money, 
pork, advertisements and supporters? A combination of both might be a reasonable 
argument, which, in any case, deserves deeper future studies. 
Figure 7.2: Predicted Probability of Municipal Victory - By Share of 
Provincial Population 
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Finally, and not surprisingly, hypothesis 8.5 is also verified in this model. As 
seen in the static distribution, former mayors are highly unlikely to recover their past 
positions when they attempt to do it from the House. In this case, even though former 
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mayors do use legislation both as a defensive and as a prospective strategy; it seems mat 
it has not been a very successful decision, assuming that they expected increased 
electoral support through these activities. 
Discussion 
The last sentence of the last paragraph restores a point already mentioned in the 
considerations of gubernatorial candidates' poor electoral performance. To what extent 
is it reasonable to suppose that bill drafting should affect general election results? 
Winning a subnational executive position involves two necessary steps: first, to get the 
candidacy; second, to win the race. Both processes are interdependent, but do not 
necessarily involve the same activities and targets. Depending on what the candidate 
selection mechanisms are, the median voter (or median principal) is likely to differ: in 
closed primaries, party adherents will be the selectorate. In open primaries, decision is 
more likely to be led by mobilized citizens, regardless of partisanship. For closed-caucus 
decisions, senior party delegates might be the relevant actors. On the contrary, in 
general races, the median voter of the whole constituency is likely to determine failure of 
success of any candidate. The central question here is whether strategic legislative 
activity is equally worth for both stages. Whom are legislators talking to at the moment 
of writing bills? I repeatedly stated that voters and party leaders are targets of bill 
drafting, as receivers of signals of a (pretended) powerful politician that deserves a 
relevant place. Co-partisans perceiving that strength might opt not to run a primary 
against that politician, or just put her in a secure spot of party lists. Voters perceiving 
responsiveness might be thankful to her, promising further electoral support and 
making it possible that the politician go to the media to show how popular she is. As a 
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feedback, leaders process that information, and the politician should be in a good 
position to get the party spot. 
However, the general election is likely to be a different world. Campaigns are 
long, tough, extremely time and resource consuming and, sometimes, bloody. Does bill 
drafting make any difference in such a hard situation? The intuition is that it might 
contribute, but probably not that much as in the previous stage. For gubernatorial 
candidates, evidence shows that it does not matter at all. For municipal contenders, the 
expectation is alive, but it does not seem to make a huge difference in the electoral 
revenue. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there is a plethora of factors that 
can affect electoral performance. I am not including those macro-components in this 
analysis, but it is difficult to think that variables like economic performance or 
presidential perception do not affect even subnational choice. The interesting point at 
this stage is to wonder whether those macro-conditions also affect the previous stage of 
candidate selection. A bad juncture would for sure influence the chances of an 
incumbent or a copartisan of a ruling officer. However, this stage seems to be more 
prone for individual-level maneuver. Understanding strategic bill drafting as a 
mechanism that is more linked to position taking for a candidacy rather than for 
securing a general victory makes the findings of this dissertation not only more accurate, 
but also more realistic. Otherwise, most of the literature linking clientelism and 
patronage (Calvo and Murillo 2004, Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes 2005, Kemahlioglu 
2007) with electoral performance would be overshadowed by the power of symbolic 
politics. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This dissertation aimed to fill a theoretical gap in the literatures of political 
ambition, political careers and legislative behavior in multi-level systems with 
progressive ambition. As well as the detailed scope of the universe would have 
predicted a relatively simple task; the complexity of the multiple interactions among 
actors, goals, institutions and political arenas foresaw how difficult this enterprise 
would be. Even though this project ended up being extremely time- and energy 
consuming, I feel it has been worth it to solve several empirical and theoretical 
questions, while raising new and more interesting questions. 
The first contribution lies at the theoretical level. Throughout this dissertation, it 
was asked if politicians acting in an environment with well known constraints (low 
pursuit of reelection, multilevel ambition) had incentives for strategic anticipation of 
further goals. As the empirical tests have demonstrated, this statement can be judged 
true for the case under study. Current legislators having a subnational executive 
expectation face incentives to highlight aspects of their prospective constituents in the 
content of their bills, and so they do. This behavior has been particularly true in the case 
of Deputies who have mayoral expectations. As Schumacher (1973) said, "Small is 
beautiful", and that is the way these legislators seem to think at the moment of writing 
legislation. By targeting municipalities, ambitious politicians try to maximize their 
(relatively scarce) available resources associated with their office, and expect to improve 
their future perspectives. In sum, following rational choice statements, ambitious 
legislators have been doing the right tilings, considering their preferences over 
outcomes. 
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A second contribution of this project is also theoretical, and explores the links 
between two literatures that have barely spoken each other: political ambition and 
legislative performance. As stated repeated times, scholars in American politics have 
(almost tacitly) considered this relationship as a logical extension of their main causal 
mechanism. Statically ambitious legislators without many party constraints face 
multiple incentives towards individualization, construction of a personal capital and 
diffusion of their work in office. In this sense, political ambition and legislative 
performance are heads and tails of the same coin, at the same time. Conversely, studies 
of comparative settings with different frameworks and motivations from those of the 
U.S House have never analyzed how anticipation of multi-level career goals shapes 
current legislative activity. One of the reasons for this apparent lack of interest may be 
linked to the supposed marginal importance of legislatures in the policy making process 
in presidential regimes outside the U.S. Other sources of scientific apathy might have to 
do with one of the main discoveries of this dissertation for the Argentine case: 
individual-level attributes matter for legislative activity, something that has been 
overlooked by the literature in the area until these days. If legislator-level activity is 
assumed to be irrelevant, linking ambition and bill drafting is definitely a waste of time. 
After realizing that individual activity does make a difference, increasing efforts 
towards understanding the motivations behind bill drafting should be seen. 
However, as several Americanists have highlighted in presentations of this 
project, the theoretical question should not be "why look at bill drafting and ambition 
together?", but "why have ambition and bill drafting been always analyzed separately?" Are 
they not interdependent? Scholarly research in European legislatures (Doling 1995) has 
explored how legislators try to submit private legislation that targets their constituents. 
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If such a behavior is visible in strongly party-based political regimes like parliamentary 
countries, why should it not also be characteristic of legislators in presidential systems? 
This was the question and the answer is "they do", even in environments that would not 
predict its existence, such as the Argentine case. Nested analysis of drafted legislation 
and career goals are also likely to contribute to the advancement of studies on political 
recruitment, patterns of cabinet composition, agenda control and responsiveness, among 
others. Representative of this research line is the recent top-notch project led by 
Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard (2009), where they collected information on the 
backgrounds of every member of the European Parliament. They explicitly discuss 
parties' nomination strategies and individual-level predictors of getting a regional seat; 
and will extend their analysis to bill drafting and career decisions in the next months. 
Similar perspectives are likely to emerge for more comparable cases of multilevel 
systems such as the Mexican46 case. 
The third theoretical contribution of this project has to do with the expected 
effects of electoral systems. Even though the mayor theoretical findings of the literature 
have remained untouched (i.e. the effects of closed lists and proportional representation 
over legislators' degrees of freedom), this project highlights how important the federal 
dimension can be. Systems including most of the predictors of no individual-level 
activity might fail accounting for how mixed incentives from territorial bases of support 
can affect legislators' behavior. Parties can matter in many ways, including the 
prosecution of further offices. However, whenever loyalty and maintenance of bases of 
support struggle, predictions made at the institutional level can be flawed, and 
46
 As discussed with Joy Langston and Javier Aparicio, a replication of this analysis for the Mexican case is 
almost a must-do that might become subject of collaborative research in the short future. 
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individuals may opt for securing their personal sources of legitimacy and power. This 
does not imply any contradiction with the well established literature, but only a 
refinement that deserves additional in-depth research. 
On the purely empirical side, this dissertation provides several contributions. In 
terms of the comparative literature, it considers a new relationship not covered by the 
conventional pieces. As mentioned, Samuels (2004) gave a fabulous insight about 
Brazilian legislative politics, but did not reach such a level of disaggregation to analyze 
politicians' congressional behavior over the basis of their career goals. A similar 
approach to that employed in this essay would substantially improve the knowledge of 
politicians' strategies and objectives in the Brazilian Camara dos Deputados; it would also 
simplify the evaluation of related topics such as campaign strategies, fundraising, 
coattails effects and vertical coalitions. Similar arguments could be applied to cases like 
Mexico (as mentioned) and Venezuela (both federal), or also to unitary yet multilevel 
settings such as Uruguay, Colombia or even Bolivia. Beyond Latin American 
presidential democracies, Montero (2006,2007) shows that politicians in Spain also have 
multilevel shifts between the federal Parliament and the regional chambers. Extending 
his analysis to the levels of legislation introduced would surely enrich his conclusions 
and extensions. 
Another relevant decision that may affect future perspectives has to do with the 
selection of the sample. As repeatedly mentioned throughout this dissertation, the use of 
the whole set of bills ever introduced in the Argentine Congress has strong implications 
over the findings. On the one hand, it overcomes any kind of selection bias, as it could 
perfectly happen with the use of roll call data or particular subsets of bills. However, 
such a decision is not totally free of problems. As well as many analysts of American 
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politics suggest just to analyze final passage votes; an attentive observer might criticize 
that the full sample could be full of irrelevant legislation that is not the core of political 
conflict. Rather, analyzing just public bills, or those involving most of the budget, might 
give a more accurate depiction of the political process in Argentina. Once again, as 
stated, no choice is perfect and free of problems; however, I still believe that looking at 
the whole picture is a more accurate strategy than just analyzing an arbitrarily cut 
sample of bills. What would be the impact of such a strategy on the findings of the 
existing literature? Would it help solve the controversies between party-free (Ames 1994, 
Samuels 2004) versus party-based (Limongi and Figueiredo 1998) behavior in the 
Brazilian House? Would it alter the patterns of inter- and intra-coalition voting behavior 
in Chile, in comparison to what Aleman and Saiegh (2007) found? What would be the 
impact on Crisp et al's (2005) conclusions about vote-seeking behavior in ten Latin 
American chambers? These questions recognize the relevance of previous findings, but 
also pose challenges to conventional knowledge, more on the side of data and measures 
than to the authors' substantive questions. 
In terms of the contributions to the Argentina-based research, this dissertation 
fits well as a bridge among some of the best existing pieces in the literature. As pointed 
out in chapter 3, findings about congressional performance (Jones 1997, Mustapic 2000, 
Jones and Hwang 2005, Calvo 2007, Aleman and Calvo 2008, Jones, Hwang and Micozzi 
2008), political careers Qones et al 2002) and federalism (Benton 2003, Spiller and 
Tommasi 2007) have rarely been related. This study not only integrates the excellent 
empirical literature about careers and legislative activity, but also includes a dimension 
that was totally absent in previous research: individual-level behavior. However, as I 
clarified in previous sections, the goal is not to deny that parties and leaders are central 
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actors in Argentine politics, but to add individual calculations and strategies aside from 
collective determinants. Doing so, I forge a more comprehensive depiction of political 
activity. 
Another relevant contribution of this project has to do with the collection and 
organization of basic information. Even though it can be hard to believe for the 
standards of information access in more developed countries; no centralized official 
records about public officers exist in Argentina. Considering that the list of governors, 
mayors and also candidates for these positions was a necessary condition for this 
project, I decided to collect the data by myself. As a consequence, researchers will be 
able to count with this information in the future and empirically test multiple 
hypotheses. In parallel, the creation of a comprehensive archive of ballots between 1983 
and 2007 not only constructs a reliable primary source of information, but also generates 
a safeguard for the preservation of historical records. This data gathering process and 
the databases created as a consequence are substantive contributions themselves, 
especially in a so strong federal country as Argentina. Counting with this information, 
further research will be much easier for scholars in general, and for me in particular. 
Multiple extensions of the arguments of this piece can be tested. As an example, 
incumbency advantage at the mayoral level in multilevel settings can be tested. 
Similarly, comparisons between the House and the Senate in terms of goals and strategic 
use of bills can be also easily performed. 
A substantial new direction with potential impacts on further research is related 
with a key distinction made in this project: governors and mayors are not the same. This 
differentiation helped opening the "subnational black box" that restricted most of the 
province-level analysis to gubernatorial dynamics. Even though it is true that governors 
I l l 
are keystones of power in Argentine politics, mayoral positions are also considerably 
strong. Moreover, some extremely powerful governors based their strength in a 
structure of loyal mayors that built up an almost invincible electoral machine. Thus, 
should legislators not enact strategies to become mayors? In this case, should these 
strategies not be different in scope, cost and degrees of competitiveness? As Chapter 5 
and 6 demonstrate, when territorial boundaries of ambition change, prospective 
behavior does too. In as much, defensive strategies also change over the basis of past 
subnational experience. As a consequence, further work on subnational politics in 
Argentina should take into account the huge within-province variation, as well as the 
effects of municipal actors even on federal politics. 
Finally, the distinction of the differential effect of strategic bill drafting on 
chances of winning the candidacy and general electoral victory makes also a substantive 
point for the future. Anticipation of further ambition involves maximizing currently 
available resources. However, the final outcome of the goal varies across time, subjects 
and circumstances. At the stage of defining who will have access to office, politics 
become a zero-sum game. Thus, not every single legislator who behaves strategically 
will end up winning the spot they desire. However, this does not imply that strategic 
use of legislation cannot be useful for the first step towards becoming a mayor or a 
governor. Territorial targets may act as signals to party leaders, comrades and party 
loyalists that vote in a primary. Success at this stage is not fully independent from future 
performance, but it differs from victory in a general election. In fact, as chapter 7 
demonstrates, no substantive effect of legislative submission on success could be found. 
However, legislators keep on submitting targeted bills. Is this behavior just a way of 
wasting time, or is it the product of other intermediate steps for which bills could be 
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really useful? This rhetoric question anticipates further research lines empirically 
assessing the relationships between intra-party competition and legislative behavior. 
In sum, this dissertation had several goals at different levels. After overcoming 
severe empirical challenges, it resulted in specific findings that contribute to the 
understanding of legislative behavior in multilevel systems. First, legislators can act 
strategically, and in fact they do it in the Argentine Congress. The use of legislation is a 
valuable resource for these non-reelection seekers and they effectively use these bills 
whenever they aspire a municipal position. This is true both for defensive (previous 
background) and prospective (further ambition) goals, but it does not seem to affect 
gubernatorial candidates from the House. These findings not only show mat individual-
level behavior is relevant for the comprehension of legislative politics in Argentina; but : 
also reconciles the traditional party-based explanations with personalized strategic : 
behavior. Doing so, it contributes to the creation of a theoretical artifact that has an 
enormous future for comparative research: a general theory of legislative behavior in 
multilevel systems with non-static ambition. 
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